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1. Introduction 
Although economic theories usually assume the full rationality of the agents, economists 
have long recognized that individuals’ decision making is limited by their cognitive abilities 
(Simon, 1955). One type of cognitive limitation discussed by Lacetera, Pope, and Sydnor 
(2012) is that customers in the used car market tend to adopt round numbers as cognitive 
shortcuts to save energy spent on extensive algorithmic processing when making purchase 
decisions. If investors carry the same heuristics over to financial decisions, their cognitive 
limitation can be manifested in their limit order submission behavior. A disproportionately 
large volume of limit orders submitted at round numbers by an investor may be indicative of a 
low level of cognitive ability, and vice versa.  
We first investigate the existence of cognitive limitation in investors’ order submission 
behavior. Our data are from the Taiwan Futures Exchange (TAIFEX) and consist of detailed 
information about orders and transactions. Based on this data, we are able to examine whether 
the limit orders submitted by investors tend to cluster at round-number prices, and whether 
this limit order clustering phenomenon is particularly pronounced for individual investors. If 
investors are not cognitively constrained and hence do not have to rely on round-number 
heuristics, then their limit orders will be submitted at any given index point, resulting in 
uniformly distributed limit order prices in the last one or two digits. However, if investors rely 
on round numbers as heuristic shortcuts, they will submit more limit orders at round-number 
prices. For example, the proportion of limit orders submitted at multiples of 100 (the last two 
digits of the index prices are “00”) will be larger than 1%. 
Next, we explore whether investors with lower cognitive abilities, defined by higher limit 
order submission ratios at round-number prices, exhibit inferior investment performance. 
Intuitively, cognitively constrained investors might have poor investment performance either 
because they have low capability to access and interpret information or because their 
investment decisions are more likely to be affected by behavioral biases associated with the 
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cognitive limitation.1 Because the overrepresentation of round-numbered limit orders largely 
stems from the ease of the cognitive accessibility of those numbers, a higher submission ratio 
at round numbers indicates a lower degree of cognitive ability at the investor level. 
Accordingly, we argue that the submission ratio at round-number prices is negatively 
associated with investment performance. 
Last, we examine how “learning-by-trading” affects investors’ tendencies to submit limit 
orders at round-number prices. The investor learning literature is still debating whether 
trading experience helps investors to make better investment decision. On the one hand, 
investors could learn from past trading experience and make better subsequent investment 
decisions (e.g., Feng and Seasholes, 2005). On the other hand, investors could also learn in a 
naive and reinforcement way such that they invest less effectively in the future (e.g., Chiang, 
Hirshleifer, Qian, and Sherman, 2011). In our context, we test how the round-numbered limit 
order submission behavior is influenced by investors’ past trading frequency and the past 
returns of round-numbered limit orders to shed light on the debate. 
Using over 100 million limit orders in TAIFEX from January 2003 to September 2008, 
we document a strong and persistent limit order clustering pattern. The average submission 
ratio at multiples of 100 (the last two digits of the limit order prices are “00”) is 3.1% during 
our sample period. The limit order clustering at multiples of 100 is the strongest, followed by 
those at multiples of 50 and 10. Furthermore, limit order clustering is more pronounced for 
individual investors who submit 4.1% of their limit orders at “00.” Institutional investors also 
exhibit round-number heuristics, but in a much smaller magnitude (1.6% of their limit orders 
are submitted at “00”). The results also show that limit order clustering is prevalent among 
various product types. Moreover, the limit order clustering is persistent across years for 
individual investors. 
In addition, we document a large cross-sectional heterogeneity in the submission ratio at 
                                                             
1 According to Subrahmanyam (1991), the effects of information asymmetry and adverse selection costs are less 
significant in the index futures market than in markets for individual securities. Hence, in our setting, a lack of 
private information is less likely to be the channel through which cognitive limitation is associated with investment 
performance. 
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round-number prices. After sorting investors into five groups based on the proportion of 
orders submitted at round numbers, we find that the top-quintile individual investors submit 
over 62.5% of their limit orders at multiples of ten (the last two digits of the order prices are 
X0, where X is an integer ranging from 0 to 9) while those in the bottom quintile submit only 
9.2% at “X0.” 
This limit order clustering phenomenon cannot be explained by the existing hypotheses 
on price clustering, which involve market makers or dealers specifying the prices in 
quote-driven markets. For example, Harris (1991) argues that price clustering reduces the cost 
of negotiating between traders and dealers (negotiation hypothesis). Christie and Schultz 
(1994) argue that the price clustering at NASDAQ may be attributed to dealers’ implicitly 
collusion for maintaining wide spreads (collusion hypothesis). Neither can the limit order 
clustering be driven by investors’ need to hedge their index options positions through index 
futures contracts for the following two reasons. First, we find similar results using a 
subsample of investors with no index options trading. Second, the option strike prices are only 
set in multiples of 100 while the documented limit order clustering pattern is also prevalent at 
other round numbers. 
Next, we use the submission ratio at multiples of 10 as an indicator of the level of 
cognitive limitation to test whether the ratio is related to investment performance.2 We find 
that individual investors with higher submission ratios at “X0” in the previous year have 
significantly lower intraday, 1-day, and 5-day mark-to-market index returns of their limit 
orders in the current year. After sorting investors into five groups based on the proportion of 
orders submitted at round numbers, we find a negative correlation between round-numbered 
limit order submission ratio and investment performance in a monotonic fashion. The 
individuals with lower cognitive abilities (the top-quintile proportion of orders submitted at 
round numbers) underperform the investors with higher cognitive abilities (the 
                                                             
2 We do not use the submission ratio at multiples of 100 because this ratio cannot fully reflect the round-number 
heuristics of investors who trade less actively. It is possible that less active investors submit limit orders at prices 
other than multiples of 100 simply because the current market price does not happen to be around those levels. 
However, the results are qualitatively the same if the submission ratio at multiples of 100 is used as the indicator 
for the level of cognitive limitation. 
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bottom-quintile proportion of orders submitted at round numbers) by 3.9 basis points within a 
trading day. This underperformance is also significant for institutional investors.  
For the multivariate analyses, we regress the intraday, 1-day, or 5-day mark-to-market 
returns for each investor in the current year on the submission ratio at round-number prices in 
the previous year and several control variables, such as the logged number of limit orders 
submitted in the previous year and a proxy for the disposition effect. Furthermore, we use the 
block bootstrapping at the annual level to estimate the empirical p-values for the estimated 
coefficients of the submission ratios to address the concern that each investor might not 
represent an independent observation within a sample year. The results remain that the 
investment performance is positively associated with the cognitive abilities of individual 
investors. 
One alternative explanation that might be consistent with the documented negative 
relation between the limit order submission ratio at round numbers and the investment 
performance is that investors rationally pay for the cognitive convenience. Intuitively, if 
investors pay for the cognitive energy they save by using round numbers as heuristic shortcuts, 
they are intentionally sacrificing a certain proportion of their profits for the limit orders 
submitted at round-number prices. This “pay-for-cognitive-shortcut” hypothesis implies that 
the inferior performance for top-quintile investors should only appear in the limit orders with 
round-number prices. However, if the submission ratio at round numbers reveals an investor’s 
cognitive limitation, the inferior performance could also be observed for the limit orders 
submitted at other prices, the market orders, and the round-trip trades. 
The results show that compared with investors with higher cognitive abilities, the 
underperformance of individual investors with lower cognitive abilities exists for both their 
round-numbered limit orders and the limit orders submitted at other prices. When we compare 
the performance of limit orders submitted at each of the “XY” price points (X and Y are both 
integers ranging from 0 to 9), we find that for 86 out of 100 different “XY” price points, 
individual investors with lower cognitive abilities have significantly lower intraday returns 
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than their counterparts. As for institutional investors, the underperformance is significant only 
for 17 out of 100 different price points.  
Individual investors with lower cognitive abilities also have inferior performance on their 
intraday, 1-day, and 5-days market orders and round-trip trades. For example, the intraday 
performance difference in market orders is 4.9 basis points between the investors with higher 
cognitive abilities and those with lower cognitive abilities. The magnitude of the 
underperformance is comparable with that of the limit orders and the result is less significant 
for institutional investors. The results thus do not support the “pay-for-cognitive-shortcut” 
hypothesis.  
Moreover, we adopt the transaction-based calendar time (TBCT) portfolio approach used 
in Seasholes and Zhu (2010) as an alternative methodology. For each day, we sort investors 
who trade a specific product into quintiles according to their limit order submission ratios at 
“X0” in the previous year. We then test whether the cognitive ability is associated with a 
higher tendency to hold more long positions relative to short positions during market up-turns. 
This allows us to evaluate the investors’ market-timing abilities. The results show that 
individual investors with lower cognitive abilities tend to hold fewer index futures contracts 
when prices are rising and more when prices are falling, compared with the investors with 
higher cognitive abilities. This suggests that the underperformance of individual investors 
with lower cognitive abilities might be partially attributed to their poor market timing ability. 
The economic loss due to cognitive limitation is nontrivial. The total amount of annual 
loss per individual based on round-trip trades amounts to 85,255 Taiwanese dollars (TWD).3 
This significant amount of loss is not due to investors trading too much, as is documented in 
Barber and Odean (2000) and Barber, Lee, Liu, and Odean (2009). In fact, the investors with 
the lowest cognitive abilities trade much less than those with the highest abilities. Collectively, 
the findings are more in line with the notion that the poor investment performance of the 
investors who submit more limit orders at round-number prices is due to their low cognitive 
abilities.  
                                                             
3 The exchange rate was 0.0305 USD/TWD, on average, during our sample period.  
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For the final question on the effect of investor learning, we regress the change in 
submission ratio at “X0” each year on the logged number of limit orders submitted in the 
previous year, past submission ratio at round numbers, past investment returns of limit orders 
submitted at round numbers, and difference in the durations of winning and losing round-trip 
trades. The logged number of limit orders submitted in the previous year helps to reduce 
individual investors’ propensity to submit limit orders with round-number prices. The result is 
consistent with Feng and Seasholes (2005), Dhar and Zhu (2006), and Seru, Shumway, and 
Stoffman (2010), all of whom argue that past trading experience improves financial decisions. 
We do not find significant effect of the past returns of round-numbered limit orders on the 
subsequent limit order submission behavior, which is not in line with the implications of 
reinforcement learning. 
For robustness checks, we conduct a cross-market analysis of a subsample of investors 
who trade both index futures and index options to validate the effect of cognitive limitation on 
individual investor performance. Investors with lower cognitive abilities, identified by their 
limit order submission ratio at round numbers in the index futures contracts, behave in a 
similar fashion in their options trading. The results remain the same when we use various 
definitions of round-number prices and different filters to deal with outlier issues. In addition, 
we find a similar negative association between the round-number submission ratio and 
longer-term (monthly) investment performance for individual investors. 
This study is related to Bhattacharya, Holden, and Jacobsen (2012), who document 
buy-sell imbalance, based on the Lee and Ready (1991) method, around round-number prices 
in the US stock market. Our study complements theirs but differs in relation to the following 
key features. First, Bhattacharya et al. (2012) argue that the buy-sell imbalance stems from the 
combination of limit order clustering and sophisticated investors’ undercutting. Using the 
entire limit orders data in TAIFEX, we provide direct evidence of their first assumption and 
show that limit orders indeed cluster at round-number prices. Second, they show that the order 
imbalance can explain much of the difference in trade performance at various price points, 
indicating that the round-number heuristics influence trade performance at the order level. 
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Complementary to their order-level findings, we investigate the influence of round-number 
heuristics on investment performance at the investor level. The account identity information 
allows us to track an investor’s limit order submission behavior and investment performance 
to examine the effect of cognitive limitation at the investor level. Third, we provide 
cross-market evidence that cognitive ability, as revealed by limit order clustering, is an inner 
trait of investors in their financial decisions. 
This study also complements the work of Grinblatt, Keloharju, and Linnainmaa (2012), 
who find that high-IQ investors outperform their low-IQ counterparts. Compared with the 
mathematical, verbal, and logical ability measured by the IQ test, the submission ratio at 
round-number prices reflects the extent to which investors’ cognitive limitation is revealed in 
the financial markets. In particular, we are linking investors’ cognitive limitation, manifested 
in one aspect of their financial decisions, to their overall investment performance. In addition, 
the entire record of orders and trades with investor type enable us to draw implications for 
both individual and institutional investors. The cognitive limitation negatively affects the 
investment performance of individual investors, whereas the effect is less significant among 
institutional investors. 
Our research contributes to the literature in the following two dimensions. First, we 
provide a new methodology that can be implemented in any data set with identified investor 
orders and trades data to study the association between cognitive limitation and investment 
performance. This is distinctive, as other existing cognitive ability measures, such as IQ, 
might not be available or might not directly reflect the financial acumen of investors. Second, 
we provide additional supportive evidence that past trading frequency helps improve financial 
cognitive ability. Thus, we also shed light on the debate playing out in the investor learning 
literature.  
 
2. Related Literature and Hypotheses Development 
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2.1 Literature on Cognitive Limitation 
Having originated primarily from psychology, the literature has shown that people often 
use cognitive shortcuts when processing information and making decisions (see Gilovich, 
Griffin, and Kahneman, 2002, for a review). One type of cognitive limitation identified by 
Rosch (1975) is that people rely on round numbers, such as multiples of 10, as cognitive 
reference points. Schindler and Kirby (1997) analyze the rightmost digits of selling prices in a 
sample of retail price advertisements and show that the overrepresentation of the digits 0 and 
5 can be explained by their high cognitive accessibility. Lacetera, Pope, and Sydnor (2012), 
studying heuristic information processing in the used-car market, find that the tendency to 
focus on the left-most digit of a number affects customers’ purchase decisions, which results 
in price discontinuity around the round numbers. 
In the context of the financial market, extensive studies have shown that asset prices 
cluster at round numbers.4 Aitken, Brown, Buckland, Izan, and Walter (1996) interpret the 
asset price clustering as investors having a natural “attraction” to round-number prices. Using 
trade records, Bhattacharya, Holden, and Jacobsen (2011) document an abnormal buy-sell 
imbalance when the stock price is one cent above or below round numbers. They argue that 
the phenomenon is due to a combination of limit order clustering and strategic limit order 
undercut by sophisticated investors.  
 2.2 Cognitive Limitation and Limit Order Clustering  
Our first hypothesis stems from the tendency of some investors to use round numbers as 
cognitive shortcuts to save energy spent in extensive algorithmic processing, which leads to a 
disproportionately large volume of limit orders submitted at round-number prices.5 However, 
due to data availability, few studies have directly studied investors’ limit order submission 
                                                             
4 See Neiderhoffer (1965, 1966); Ball, Torous, and Tschoegl (1985); Harris (1991); Goodhart and Curcio (1991); 
Christie and Schultz (1994); Christie, Harris, and Schultz (1994); Ley and Varian (1994); Gwilym, Clare, and 
Thomas (1998a, 1998b); Booth, Kallunki, Lin, and Martikainen (2000); Palmon, Smith, and Sopranzetti (2004); 
and Sonnemans (2005). 
5 This study also relates to the recent wave of research on investor inattention and trading (Barber and Odean, 
2008; Hirshleifer, Lim, and Teoh, 2009; Yuan, 2012, among others). While Barber and Odean (2008) and Yuan 
(2012) study limited cognitive capability at the market level, we investigate whether there is heterogeneity in 
cognitive limitation at the investor level, and whether that is related to investment performance.   
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behavior. For instance, Osler (2003) analyzes the currency orders submitted to a specific 
dealer (NatWest Markets) between August 1,1999 and April 11, 2000 and finds that investors’ 
price preference is in the order of integer, halves, and quarters.6 With the complete records on 
the trades and quotes of both individual and institutional investors for a much longer period in 
Taiwan futures market, we propose and test the following hypothesis:   
 
Hypothesis 1: Investors submit a disproportionately large volume of limit orders at 
round-number prices to save cognitive energy. The limit order clustering phenomenon is more 
evident when the price is a more cognitively accessible round number, and among individual 
investors. 
 
Because limit orders are directly submitted by investors, the existing hypotheses on stock 
price clustering i.e., the negotiation hypothesis in Harris (1991) and the collusion hypothesis 
in Christie and Schultz (1994), cannot explain the limit order clustering. Both of the 
aforementioned hypotheses rely on the quote-driven trading mechanism in which market 
makers are responsible for providing quotes to maintain a liquid market whenever necessary, 
whereas TAIFEX operates under an order-driven trading mechanism in which there are no 
designated market makers. However, the documented limit order clustering might result from 
investors’ need to hedge their index options positions, which have round-numbered strike 
prices. We address this potential explanation in two ways. First, we conduct a subsample 
analysis with investors that have no index options trading. Second, because the index options 
strike prices are only in multiples of 100, they cannot account for the limit order clustering at 
multiples of 50 and 10.    
 2.3 Cognitive Limitation and Investment Performance 
If the limit order submission ratio at round-number prices reflects an investor’s cognitive 
                                                             
6 Ahn, Cai, and Cheung (2005); Bourghelle and Cellier (2007); and Chiao and Wang (2009) also find limit order 
clustering at round numbers in smaller samples from the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, Euronext Paris for CAC 40 
shares, and the Taiwan Stock Exchange, respectively.  
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ability and financial acumen, the ratio may be associated with her investment performance. 
The poor investment performance of investors with lower cognitive abilities could result from 
a lower capability of acquiring and correctly interpreting information, or from more 
investment decisions that are affected by behavioral biases associated with the cognitive 
limitation. Several proxies for investors’ cognitive abilities have been proposed in the 
literature to study how cognitive limitation is associated with investment performance. 
Chevalier and Ellison (1999) and Gottesman and Morey (2006) find that mutual fund 
performances can be predicted by the fund managers’ average Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) 
scores and average Graduate Management Admission Test (GMAT) scores, respectively. 
Grinblatt, Keloharju, and Linnainmaa (2012) use the IQ scores of middle-aged male 
individual investors in Finland and find that high-IQ investors outperform low-IQ investors. 
Using the limit order submission ratio at round-number prices as a proxy of cognitive ability, 
our second hypothesis is as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 2: Cognitive limitation, defined by the limit order submission ratio at 
round-number prices, is negatively associated with investors’ subsequent investment 
performance.  
 
We consider an additional testable hypothesis, which could also explain the negative 
association between the limit order submission ratio at round numbers and investment 
performance. If investors rationally pay for the cognitive energy they save by using round 
numbers as cognitive shortcuts, they essentially pay for the convenience they enjoy by 
submitting limit orders at round-number prices. Under this “pay-for-cognitive-shortcut” 
hypothesis, poor performance should only be exhibited for the round-numbered limit orders 
and not for the orders with other prices. However, if the submission ratio at round numbers 
represents investors’ cognitive abilities, the inferior performance of investors with higher 
submission ratios should be found for the limit orders submitted at other prices, the market 
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orders, and the round-trip trades. Such poor performance may also be observed for the other 
assets they invest in, for example, the index options. The richness of our data set allows us to 
shed light on the different implications of these two alternative hypotheses. 
It is important to note that instead of the mathematical, verbal, and logical abilities 
measured in the aforementioned tests, the submission ratio at round-number prices is a 
measure of cognitive limitation, which is revealed in investors’ limit order submission 
behavior. The ratio can be calculated for any data set with identified investor trading data. 
This is innovative, as other existing cognitive ability measures might not be available on a 
large scale. 
 2.4 Cognitive Limitation and Investor Learning 
The literature continues to debate whether investor learning improves investment 
decisions. Some studies argue that more trading experience could help investors to mitigate 
behavioral biases, know their investment capabilities, and enhance their performance. Feng 
and Seasholes (2005) and Dhar and Zhu (2006) both find that investors’ trading experience, 
proxied by trading frequency, mitigates the reluctance to realize losses. This indicates that 
investor learning reduces the disposition effect. Seru, Shumway, and Stoffman (2010) show 
that some individual investors become better at trading with experience while others stop 
trading after learning of their poor ability. This implies that investor learning could result in 
better investment performance. 
Other studies argue that reinforcement learning based on past investment returns might 
lead to naive optimistic behavior. Choi, Laibson, Madrian, and Metrick (2009) find that 
individual investors over-extrapolate from their personal experience when making savings 
decisions in their 401(K) accounts. Strahilevitz, Odean, and Barber (2011) show that investors 
repurchase stocks whose previous purchase resulted in positive emotions and avoid those that 
resulted in negative emotions. Chiang, Hirshleifer, Qian, and Sherman (2011) document that 
high returns in previous IPO auctions increase the likelihood of participating in future 
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auctions. However, both bidders’ returns and their auction selection abilities deteriorate with 
experience. The two streams of literature use different measures for learning; the former uses 
past trading frequency and the latter uses past investment returns. We thus propose the 
following hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 3a: Investors’ limit order submission ratios at round numbers decrease with 
the number of limit orders they submitted in the previous year. 
 
Hypothesis 3b: Investors’ limit order submission ratios at round numbers increase with 
the returns of round-numbered limit orders they traded in the previous year. 
  
 If investors learn from submitting more limit orders in the past, they may become less 
affected by the round-number heuristics, which could lead to fewer limit orders submitted at 
round-number prices in the future. In other words, this learning-by-trading process alleviates 
the effect of cognitive limitation on investment decisions. However, if investors had high 
returns for their round-numbered limit orders in the previous year and learn through 
reinforcement, they may submit even more limit orders at round numbers in the current year. 
Hence, we expect to observe a positive relation between changes in limit order submission 
ratio at round numbers and the past investment returns for the round-numbered limit orders 
they submitted.  
 
3. Data Description 
We use complete records of the orders and trades in the Taiwan Futures Exchange with 
detailed investor type and identity information from January 2003 to September 2008. The 
orders data allow us to directly study investors’ limit order submission behavior while the 
trades data allow us to evaluate the investor performance. 
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3.1 The Taiwan Futures Exchange 
Investors are allowed to submit orders to the TAIFEX Electronic Trading System (ETS) 
from 8:30 a.m. to 1:45 p.m., Monday through Friday. Orders submitted before 8:45 a.m. or 
after 1:40 p.m. are matched by the open and close auctions, respectively. From 8:45 a.m. to 
1:40 p.m., orders are matched immediately once they enter the ETS. The matching rules of 
this continuous auction system are price priority and time priority.  
From January 2003 to September 2008, the two major contracts traded in TAIFEX were 
the Taiwan Stock Exchange Index Futures (hereafter TXF), and the Mini-Taiwan Stock 
Exchange Index Futures (hereafter MXF). The TXF are based on all listed stocks on the 
Taiwan Stock Exchange and the MXF are a mini version of the TXF with roughly one-quarter 
of the margin and payoff. One index point increase in the transaction price yields a profit of 
200 (50) TWD for one TXF (MXF) contract. Internet Appendix A provides more of the 
institutional details for TAIFEX.7  
 3.2 Submitted Limit Orders 
In each submitted limit order, we observe its investor type (individual or institutional) 
and account number, along with other relevant information such as order price, quantity, 
submission time, etc. Panel A of Table 1 reports that in total, we have 108 million records of 
submitted limit orders during our sample period.8 Among these orders, 61.87% are submitted 
by individual investors. Panel B shows that the total number of contracts submitted is 322 
million, with 44.64% from individual investors. Individual investors in Taiwan seem to be 
more willing to trade index futures, compared with other developed markets. We discuss this 
phenomenon in Internet Appendix A. 
When testing the investment performance and investor learning, we require that investors 
submit at least 10 limit orders in the two consecutive years to have a meaningful submission 
                                                             
7 Institutional details for TAIFEX can also be found in Kuo and Lin (2013); Liu, Tsai, Wang, and Zhu (2010); and 
Li, Lin, Cheng, and Lai (2012). 
8 TAIFEX has a daily price limit of 7% in two ways, and the orders are valid only for one day. Therefore, we 
exclude limit orders that are submitted outside this range. 
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ratio at round numbers. In total, we have 156,171 investor-year observations.9  
 3.3 Executed Orders 
Panel C of Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics for the number of executed contracts. 
There are 112 million contracts executed in total, with 68.80% from individual investors. The 
index level in TAIFEX ranges from 4,011 to 9,934. Therefore, we look at the last two digits of 
the order price to identify the round-number prices.  
  
4. Limit Order Clustering at Round-number prices  
Using detailed records of limit orders, in this section we address the following questions: 
Do investors submit a disproportionately large volume of limit orders at round-number prices? 
If yes, does the limit order clustering pattern differ between different investor types and 
products? Is the limit order clustering phenomenon persistent over time? What might the 
strategic order submission be, based on the limit order clustering phenomenon?  
 4.1 Limit Order Clustering at Round-number prices 
To identify round-number prices, we focus on the last two digits of the limit order prices. 
For example, if a limit buy order price is 4,500, we characterize the order as “submitted at 00.” 
Limit order prices can end with 100 different “XYs” (where X and Y are integers ranging 
from 0 to 9). We refer to round-number prices as XY = 00, 10, 20, …, 90 and calculate the 
submission ratio as: 
 
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑋𝑋 = 𝑁𝑆𝑁𝑆𝑁𝑁 𝑆𝑜 𝑙𝑆𝑁𝑆𝑆 𝑆𝑁𝑜𝑁𝑁𝑜 𝑜𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑜 𝑆𝑆 "𝑋Y" 𝑇𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑙 𝑁𝑆𝑁𝑆𝑁𝑁 𝑆𝑜 𝑜𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑜 𝑙𝑆𝑁𝑆𝑆 𝑆𝑁𝑜𝑁𝑁𝑜                               (1) 
 
The submission ratio measures the proportion of orders submitted with the last two digits 
                                                             
9 Figure B1 of Internet Appendix B reports the cumulative distribution of the annual number of limit orders 
submitted by individual and institutional investors. In general, around 70% of individual investors trade more than 
10 contracts per year. 
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of the order prices being “XY.” Theoretically, if investors trade index futures fully based on 
their information, and are not cognitively constrained, their limit orders should be equally 
likely to be submitted at any given price. In contrast, if investors are affected by the 
round-number heuristics, they would submit disproportionately more limit orders at 
round-number prices.  
The limit order submission ratio is plotted by the last two digits of the order prices in 
Panel A of Figure 1, which shows that limit order clustering is evident in TAIFEX.10 The 
submission ratio is 3.1% at “00,” which is 2.2% higher than that at “99” and “01.” The most 
favored prices are those that end with “00,” followed by those that end with “50,” and then 
“20,” “80,” etc.11 This indicates that when investors submit limit orders, they tend to choose 
a round-number order price, and the submission ratio at “XY” is increasing in its cognitive 
accessibility, i.e., the roundness of the numbers.12  
One alternative explanation for the limit order clustering phenomenon is that investors 
hedge their positions in index options by index futures contracts, which only have 
round-numbered strike prices. However, the basic findings remain unchanged when we 
restrict our sample to investors that do not trade index options during our sample period. The 
results are reported in Figure B3 of Internet Appendix B. In addition, the strike prices of index 
options are only in multiples of 100, therefore, the hedging demand alone cannot account for 
the limit order clustering at multiples of 50 and 10. The pattern in Panel A of Figure 1 clearly 
indicates limit order clustering at round numbers other than multiples of 100, which is 
inconsistent with the hedging argument.  
 
                                                             
10 The Kolmogorov-Smirnoff test rejects the null hypothesis that the last two digits of limit orders obey the 
uniform distribution.  
11 Figure 1 also shows a pattern of declining (increasing) order volumes as we move from “X2” to “X4” (“X6” to 
“X8”) at every price level. One explanation is that the pronunciation of the number 4, irrespective of the order at 
which it appears, sounds like “death” or “die” in Mandarin, the official language in Taiwan. These numbers are 
thus considered inauspicious by some people. In contrast, the number 8 is considered auspicious in Chinese culture, 
as its pronunciation sounds like “good fortune.” Brown, Chua, and Mitchell (2002) and Brown and Mitchell (2008) 
find some support for the influence of Chinese culture and superstition on traders’ year-round number preferences. 
They also find an increased avoidance of the number 4 during the auspicious Chinese New Year, Dragon Boat, and 
Mid-Autumn festivals. 
12 In Figure B2 of Internet Appendix B, we show that if we only look the last single digit, the submission ratio is 
highest at “0,” followed by “5.”  
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4.2 Limit Order Clustering for Different Order Types 
To take a closer look at the limit order clustering, we report the submission ratios 
separately for individual and institutional investors, and for TXF and MXF orders. This 
allows us to investigate whether the degree of limit order clustering varies among different 
order and product types.  
The takeaway from Panel B of Figure 1 is that the limit order clustering pattern is 
substantially more pronounced for individual investors. The submission ratio is 4.1% at “00,” 
which almost five times those for “99” and “01.” Limit orders cluster most at multiples of 100, 
then at multiples of 50, and then at other round numbers. For example, 3.1% (2.6%) orders 
are submitted with the last two digits of order prices being “50” (“80”). This is in line with 
our argument that individual investors submit round-numbered limit orders as a shortcut to 
save cognitive energy. The more cognitively accessible a number, the higher the likelihood 
that the number is chosen for the limit order price. 
Panel C of Figure 1 shows that this pattern is similar for institutional investors, but the 
magnitude is not as large as that of individual investors. In particular, the submission ratio at 
“00” is 1.6%, which is only 0.6% higher than the uniform distribution benchmark. The results 
suggest that individual investors exhibit much more statistically significant and economically 
meaningful round-number heuristics when submitting limit orders. The institutional investors 
may exhibit some statistical significance in limit order clustering behavior, but the magnitude 
is dwarfed by that of the individual investors.   
In Figure B4 of Internet Appendix B, we also plot the submission ratio separately for the 
TXF and MXF orders. There are 3.0% (3.3%) of limit orders submitted at “00” for TXF 
(MXF). The similar proportion of limit orders submitted at round-number prices for the two 
different index future products suggests that limit order clustering is a prevalent phenomenon. 
 4.3 Multivariate Regression Analysis 
In this sub-section, we formally test the existence and prevalence of limit order clustering 
 18 
 
through regressions on dummy variables indicating round-number prices and order types. For 
each limit order, we are able to recognize whether it is submitted by an individual or 
institutional investor, and whether it is to trade MXF or TXF. For each year and for each order 
type, we calculate the proportion of orders submitted at “XY,” and perform the following 
regression: 
 
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆XY − 0.01= 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐷00 + 𝛽2𝐷50 + 𝛽3𝐷𝑋0 + 𝛽4𝐷00 × 𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽5𝐷50 × 𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽6𝐷𝑋0× 𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽7𝐷00   × 𝐷𝑀𝑋𝑀 + 𝛽8𝐷50 × 𝐷𝑀𝑋𝑀 + 𝛽9𝐷𝑋0 × 𝐷𝑀𝑋𝑀 + 𝛽10𝐷00× 𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 × 𝐷𝑀𝑋𝑀 + 𝛽11𝐷50 × 𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 × 𝐷𝑀𝑋𝑀 + 𝛽12𝐷𝑋0× 𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 × 𝐷𝑀𝑋𝑀 + 𝐷𝑆𝑜𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝑁𝑋𝑋 + 𝜀𝑋𝑋                                          (2) 
 
where 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆XY is the submission ratio at “XY” for a specific order type; 𝐷00, 𝐷50, and  𝐷𝑋0 are dummy variables for price points “00,” “50,” and “X0;” X is an integer and X≠0 or 
5; 𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 and 𝐷𝑀𝑋𝑀 are indicators for orders submitted by individual investors and MXF 
orders, respectively. 𝐷𝑆𝑜𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝑁𝑋𝑋 is the average distance of limit order price from the last 
trade price for limit orders submitted at “XY” price points.13 𝛽1, 𝛽2, and 𝛽3 measure the 
extent to which submission ratios increase at round numbers. The coefficients of the 
interaction terms, 𝛽4 to 𝛽12, measure the marginal effect of a specific order type. For 
example, if 𝛽4 is significantly larger than zero, it means that the submission ratio at “00” is 
higher for individual investors, which indicates that they are more affected by round-number 
heuristics. Table 2 reports the parameter estimates for this regression and shows the F-tests for 
the differences between 𝛽1, 𝛽2, and 𝛽3 in the last three rows. 
Table 2 Model 2 shows that when the focus is exclusively on the round-number effect, 
                                                             
13 For orders that are submitted far away from recent trade prices, we might expect more round number prices than 
that of more aggressive orders. Therefore, we include 𝐷𝑆𝑜𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝑁𝑋𝑋 as a control variable to address the effect of 
price distance. Specifically, for each limit order, the distance is calculated as the absolute difference between the 
limit order price and the last trade price scaled by the last trade price. The last trade price is defined as the first 
market transaction price in the previous second when the limit order is submitted. This definition of last trade price 
assumes that investors take the first market transaction in the previous second as the current trade price. The results 
are similar if we match the limit orders by the first transaction price in the previous minute. 
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the coefficients of 𝐷00, 𝐷50, and  𝐷𝑋0 are all significantly positive with p-values smaller 
than 0.01. The limit order submission ratio at “00” is 1.7% higher than that of the non-round 
numbers, which is consistent with the pattern in Figure 1. Moreover, the parameter estimate is 
decreasing from 𝐷00, to 𝐷50 , to 𝐷𝑋0 , and the differences between them are not only 
statistically significant but also economically meaningful. For example, the submission ratio 
at “00” is 0.8% larger than that at “X0,” whereas the submission ratio at “50” is 0.4% larger 
than that at “X0.” The proportion of orders submitted at “XY” increases in its cognitive 
accessibility, which is consistent with the idea that investors use round numbers as cognitive 
shortcuts in their investment decisions. The high economic significance of the limit order 
clustering at round numbers also mitigates the concern that our result is only driven by the 
sheer number of observations.14  
Model 3 shows that the limit order clustering at round-number prices is much more 
prominent among individual investors. The proportion of limit orders submitted by individual 
investors at “00” is 3.2% higher than non-round “XYs” (“XYs” that are not equal to “00,” 
“10,” “20,”…, “90”). The submission ratios at “50” and “X0” are also higher than the 
non-round “XYs” by 2.3% and 1.4%, respectively. Although with smaller magnitude, 
institutional investors also submit more orders at the round-number prices. Specifically, their 
submission ratio at “00” is 1% higher than the non-round “XYs”, which is also significant 
with a p-value smaller than 0.01. This is in line with Locke and Mann (2005), who show that 
institutional investors also exhibit behavioral bias such as the disposition effect. In addition, 
Liu, Tsai, Wang, and Zhu (2010) document trading patterns consistent with the prospect 
theory for market makers and other types of institutional investors. Although institutional 
investors are generally well-educated and more specialized in trading, it is still possible for 
them to exhibit a certain level of cognitive limitation and the round-number heuristics when 
determining their order prices. The lower submission ratio at round numbers compared with 
that of individual investors suggests a higher level of cognitive ability among institutional 
                                                             
14 Although we have 100 million limit orders, we only have 2,400 limit order submission ratios (observations) to 
conduct analysis for Table 2 (two investor types × two product types × six years data × 100 last two digits).  
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investors. Model 7 shows that when we incorporate the triple-interaction terms, the most 
influential factor is the individual investor dummy. The MXF orders cluster slightly more than 
the TXF orders.  
To summarize, individual investors rely more on round-number heuristics, irrespective of 
submitting the MXF or TXF orders. The clustering phenomenon of limit orders increases with 
the cognitive accessibility of the numbers, i.e., from multiples of 10, to multiples of 50, and 
multiples of 100. Overall, these results are supportive of our first hypothesis. 
 4.4 Persistence of Limit Order Clustering for Individual Investors 
To further confirm that the limit order clustering documented in the previous sub-section 
is not driven by price movements during a particular period, we look at the submission ratio at 
round-number prices in different years. To illustrate, we plot the proportion of orders 
submitted at “00” from 2003 to 2008. Figure B5 of Internet Appendix B shows that individual 
investors are consistently affected by the round-number heuristics when submitting limit 
orders. The submission ratio at “00” is above 3.5% throughout our sample period. For 
institutional investors, in contrast, the limit order clustering phenomenon seems to wane over 
time. For them, the submission ratio at “00” decreases from 2.6% to 1.5%. The result suggests 
that the limit order clustering phenomenon for individual investors is not driven by price 
movements and is persistent during our sample period. 
 4.5 Lower Execution Ratio and Longer Time-to-execution for Round-numbered Limit Orders 
Is it possible that individual investors rationally submit limit orders at round numbers to 
enjoy better liquidity? Intuitively, limit buy orders are submitted at prices slightly below the 
current index level while limit sell orders are submitted at prices slightly above the current 
index level. Therefore, when limit buy orders cluster at a round number, it is unlikely that 
limit sell orders will cluster at the same round number simultaneously. Figures B6 and B7 of 
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Internet Appendix B show that limit orders submitted at round-number prices are less likely to 
be executed, and the duration from submission to execution is also longer for the executed 
limit orders. This pattern suggests that when limit orders cluster at the round numbers, the 
benefit of higher liquidity is likely to be enjoyed by the counterparties who submit market 
orders. 
 4.6 Strategic Limit Order Undercutting 
Bhattacharya, Holden, and Jacobsen (2012) argue that sophisticated investors undercut 
limit orders one cent above round numbers when taking a long position and one point below 
when taking a short position. They find that the buy-sell order imbalance based on the Lee 
and Ready (1991) algorithm is highest (lowest) at a price ending with 99 (01) cents. To 
explore whether we do observe new buy (sell) limit orders undercutting one price point above 
(below) the round numbers, we also plot the buy-sell limit order submission ratio against the 
last two digits of index future prices. The result is in Figure B8 of Internet Appendix B, which 
indicates that the buy-sell limit order submission ratio is indeed highest at “01” and lowest at 
“99” (the last two digits of futures’ prices). This is consistent with the undercutting argument 
in Bhattacharya et al. (2012).  
Note that the buy-sell limit order submission ratio in Figure B8 is calculated based on the 
submitted limit orders while the buy-sell order imbalance in Bhattacharya et al. (2012) is 
calculated using Lee and Ready (1991) algorithm for executed orders. As most of the sell (buy) 
limit orders are picked up by market or aggressive limit buy (sell) orders and classified as the 
buyer-initiated (seller-initiated) orders, the highest point of the buy-sell limit order submission 
ratio in Figure B8 would be the lowest point of the buy-sell order imbalance in Bhattacharya 
et al. (2012), and vice versa. 
 
5. Cognitive Limitation and Investor Performance 
With the investor account identity, we are able to identify each investor and keep track of 
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her submission behavior and investment performance. In this section, our main objective is to 
test whether investors with lower cognitive abilities, manifested in a higher submission ratio 
at round-number prices in the previous year, will exhibit inferior investment performance in 
the current year. The basic thrust of our argument is that investors with lower cognitive 
abilities might have lower capabilities of accessing and interpreting information, or they are 
more susceptible to behavioral biases that have adverse impact on investment performance. 
The reasoning is in the same vein with Chevalier and Ellison (1999); Gottesman and Morey 
(2006); and Grinblatt, Keloharju, and Linnainmaa (2012). 
 5.1 The Measure of Cognitive Limitation  
Our measure for the cognitive limitation of each investor in the current year is the 
previous year’s submission ratio at the multiples of 10, i.e., the last two digits of index prices 
end with “X0” (X is an integer ranging from 0 to 9). To make sure that investors have a 
meaningful submission ratio at “X0” and investment performance, we require that investors 
submit at least 10 limit orders each year over the two consecutive years to be included in the 
sample.15 After constructing the ratio, we then sort the investors into five groups according to 
the lagged ratio (submission ratio at year t-1) for our quintile analyses in the following 
sub-sections. 
As Table 3 shows, both the lagged and current submission ratios at “X0” are quite spread 
out for the investors in different quintiles. For example, the submission ratio at “X0” of the 
quintile-1 individual investors is 9.2%, significantly lower than that (62.5%) of the quintile-5 
individual investors. The quintile-5 individual investors rely more heavily than their quintile-1 
                                                             
15 Our analysis on the association between cognitive limitation and investment performance might potentially 
suffer from the effects of investor attrition (survivorship bias) shown in Seru, Shumway, and Stoffman (2010). 
However, our argument is that investors with less cognitive abilities, represented by higher limit order submission 
ratios at round numbers, would perform worse. Because investors with least cognitive abilities are most likely to 
stop trading, the remaining investors in our empirical analyses after data filtering should have relatively better 
investment performance. Hence, the investor attrition should bias against us finding the negative relationship 
between cognitive limitation and investment performance in the quintile analysis. In addition, in Internet Appendix 
B, we also check whether our results hold up when we look at investment performance by submission ratio at 00 
only (or at 00 and 50), and require investors to submit at least five (or fifteen) limit orders each year in the two 
consecutive years. The results remain that investors with lower cognitive abilities display inferior investment 
performance. 
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counterparts on the round-number heuristics when making investment decisions. This 
significant difference in the submission ratio at round-number prices implies a high 
heterogeneity in the degree of cognitive capability among investors. For the remainder of this 
paper, investors with higher (lower) submission ratios at round numbers are referred to as Q5 
(Q1) investors. That is, Q5 (Q1) investors are viewed as those with lower (higher) cognitive 
abilities. 
The limit order submission ratio at “X0” is quite persistent. Investors with higher 
submission ratios at round numbers in the previous year tend to have higher submission ratios 
at round numbers in the current year. For example, Q5 individual investors have limit order 
submission ratios of 0.625 and 0.55 for the previous year and the current year, respectively. 
The correlation of the submission ratio at round numbers for the two consecutive years at the 
investor level is 0.72 (0.59) for individual (institutional) investors. 
Table 3 also shows that Q5 investors, both individual and institutional, have significant 
lower execution ratios for their submitted limit orders and longer time-to-execution for their 
executed limit orders than that of Q1 investors. These results are consistent with the 
order-level findings in Figures B6 and B7 of Internet Appendix B, that it is more difficult for 
investors to execute their round-numbered limit orders. 
 5.2 Cognitive Limitation and Performance of Limit Orders 
The first aspect of investment performance we look at is the mark-to-market return of 
limit orders which initiate long or short positions.16 Following Bhattacharya et al. (2012) and 
Linnainmaa (2010), we calculate the intraday return using the difference between the daily 
closing price and the initiating limit order’s execution price, divided by the execution price. 
This calculation assumes that the initiating limit orders are covered (closed-out) at the closing 
price of the trading day. For each investor-year observation, we first calculate the average 
                                                             
16 We only use initiating limit orders and market orders to evaluate the mark-to-market returns because the sum of 
mark-to-market returns for an initiating order and that for a closing order do not necessarily reflect the true 
performance of a round-trip trade. If the initiating and closing orders are executed on two different days, we are 
essentially using two different daily closing prices to calculate the returns. Hence, the sum of the two returns is an 
inaccurate calculation of the investor’s performance. 
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intraday return, and then we average them with equal weights for all of the observations in 
each quintile. We also calculate 1-day and 5-day mark-to-market returns, which use closing 
prices of t+1 and t+5, respectively. 
Figure 2 plots the mark-to-market returns against the quintile ranks of investors based on 
their limit order submission ratio at “X0”. We find that intraday returns monotonically 
decrease with the submission ratio at “X0” for individual investors. Similar patterns also exist 
for 1-day and 5-day returns. This monotonic pattern provides convincing evidence that 
cognitive ability and investment performance are positively correlated for individual investors. 
For institutional investors, no clear pattern can be observed, except for the significant 
underperformance for Q5 institutional investors. 
Table 4 presents the statistical tests between the investors with the top and the bottom 
quintiles of limit order submission ratios at round numbers. The Q5 individual investors 
underperform their Q1 counterparts by 3.9 basis points within a trading day. The inferior 
performance of the Q5 investors continues to deteriorate, and the gap widens to 14.3 basis 
points for the 5-day mark-to-market returns. For institutional investors, the difference in 
performance is also significant for intraday and 5-day returns and is mainly driven by the Q5 
institutional investors.  
Table 4 also indicates that individual investors in all quintiles experience negative 
mark-to-market returns in their limit orders, whereas only those institutional investors who 
submit substantially more limit orders at “X0” incur large losses. This is consistent with the 
findings in the literature that individual investors tend to lose money on their investments.  
In addition to the univariate sorting, we perform the following cross-sectional regression: 
 
𝑆𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑁𝐷𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑋0,𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2 𝐿𝐷�𝑁𝑖,𝑡−1� + 𝛽3 𝐷𝑆𝑜𝐷𝑆𝑜𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡       (3)  
 
where 𝑆𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑁𝐷𝑖,𝑡  is the average mark-to-market return for investor i in year t;  𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑋0,𝑖,𝑡−1 is investor i’s submission ratio at “X0” price points in year t-1; and 
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𝐿𝐷�𝑁𝑖,𝑡−1� is the logged number of limit orders submitted by an investor in year t-1, which is 
a proxy for her trading experience. 𝐷𝑆𝑜𝐷𝑆𝑜𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐷𝑖,𝑡 measures the extent to which investor i is 
affected by the disposition effect in year t, and it is defined as the difference between the 
durations of losing and winning round-trip trades, scaled by the average of the two. Odean 
(1998) shows that the tendency to hold losing investments for too long and sell winning 
investments too soon leads to lower after-tax returns. Therefore, controlling for the 
disposition effect helps us to single out the effect of cognitive limitation on investment 
performance.17 The coefficient of particular interest is 𝛽1, as it measures how cognitive 
ability is associated with investment performance. 
The first three columns of Table 9 show significantly negative coefficients of the 
submission ratio at “X0” for both individual and institutional investors. The estimated 𝛽1 
equals -0.05, implying that a one standard deviation increase in the submission ratio at “X0” 
(18.1%) leads to a 0.9 basis points decrease in the mark-to-market intraday return for 
individual investors, after controlling for trading experience and disposition effect. Similar 
results hold for the mark-to-market 1-day and 5-day returns. Notice that the coefficients for 
𝐷𝑆𝑜𝐷𝑆𝑜𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐷𝑖,𝑡 are all significantly negative, suggesting that the more an investor is affected 
by the disposition effect, the lower are the returns of their investments. This is consistent with 
the findings in Odean (1998).  
We also use a block-bootstrapping methodology to test the significance of the parameter 
estimates. This methodology mitigates the potential concern that investment performances 
across investors might be dependent for the panel regression analysis of Eq. (3). For each year 
t, we randomly select with replacement 𝑀𝑡  observations, where 𝑀𝑡  is the number of 
observations at year t in the original sample.18 We then combine the selected observations 
from 2004 to 2008 to form a new panel and re-estimate the regression of Eq. (3). We repeat 
this procedure 1,000 times and report the results in Table 9, with the empirical p-values from 
                                                             
17 Our findings remain qualitatively unchanged when we control for the distance of the limit order price to the last 
trade price at time of submission.  
18 We perform the block-bootstrapping at the annual level because the longest maturity for index futures contracts 
is one year. 
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the block-bootstrapping in brackets. The results confirm that investors’ submission ratio at 
“X0” in the previous year is significantly negatively associated with limit order returns in the 
current year. 
 5.3 Cognitive Limitation Hypothesis vs. Pay-for-cognitive-shortcut Hypothesis  
One may argue that the documented negative relation between the limit order submission 
ratio at round numbers and the investment performance may arise if investors rationally pay 
for the cognitive convenience. This “pay-for-cognitive-shortcut” hypothesis implies that the 
documented poor performance of limit orders among investors with low cognitive abilities is 
mainly driven by the round-numbered limit orders, as other limit orders are unlikely to be 
used as a way of saving cognitive energy. We thus examine the performance of the 
round-numbered limit orders, the non-round-numbered limit orders, the market orders, and 
the round-trip trades to substantiate our hypothesis. The analyses in the following three 
sub-sections help to rule out the “pay-for-cognitive-shortcut” argument.  
 5.3.1 Cognitive Limitation and Performance of Limit Orders with Round-numbered and Non-round-number Prices 
In this sub-section, we calculate the mark-to-market limit order returns separately for 
limit orders submitted at “X0” prices and for those not submitted at “X0” prices. We again 
sort investors into quintiles according to their limit order submission ratio at “X0” in the 
previous year, and look at their limit order performance in the current year. Panel A of Table 5 
shows that individual investors with lower cognitive abilities experience significantly lower 
intraday, 1-day, and 5-day returns, both for their limit orders submitted at round-number 
prices and for those submitted at non-round-number prices. 
Furthermore, we take a closer look at the performance differences between the Q5 and 
Q1 investors regarding their limit orders submitted at each of the 100 last two digit prices, 
instead of a rougher dichotomized classification of round numbers and non-round numbers. 
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The idea is that if the inferior performance of the Q5 investors, compared with their Q1 
counterparts, is concentrated on limit orders with those ten round-number prices (“X0”), then 
it would be consistent with the “pay-for-cognitive-shortcut” hypothesis. However, Table 6 
shows that out of 100 different last two digits of the order prices, we find that at 98 price 
points the Q5 individual investors have lower intraday returns than their Q1 counterparts. 
Among them, at 86 price points, the underperformance is significant at the 1% significance 
level. For institutional investors, the underperformance is significant at 17 out of 100 price 
points. Similar results also hold for 1-day and 5-day returns. 
The prevalent underperformance of individual investors with lower cognitive abilities 
exists for limit orders submitted at most price points. This corroborates our hypothesis that 
submitting a disproportionately large volume of limit orders at round-number prices is an 
indicator of investors’ cognitive limitations, which are also associated with low limit order 
mark-to-market returns. 
 5.3.2 Cognitive Limitation and Performance of Market Orders 
The mark-to-market intraday return of market orders is calculated in the same way that 
limit orders are calculated in the previous sub-section, i.e., assuming that the initiating market 
order is covered at the closing price of the trading day. For each investor-year observation, we 
first calculate the average intraday return in the current year, and then average them with 
equal weights among all of the observations in each quintile. Mark-to-market 1-day and 5-day 
returns are also calculated using the same logic. 
Table 7 shows that individual investors with a higher submission ratio at “X0” in the 
previous year earn significantly lower intraday, 1-day, and 5-day mark-to-market returns for 
their market orders in the current year. The Q5 investors underperform the Q1 investors by 4.9 
basis points in their market orders within a trading day. The magnitude is similar to that of the 
intraday limit order returns. The underperformance deteriorates to 7.9 (11.9) basis points one 
day (five days) after the transaction. The performance difference is, however, not significant 
between Q1 and Q5 institutional investors. 
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We find similar results based on multivariate regressions. The middle three columns of 
Table 9 show that the parameter estimates on the submission ratio at “X0” in year t-1 are 
significantly negative for individual investors. Specifically, a one standard deviation increase 
in the submission ratio at “X0” (18.1%) leads to a 1.1 basis points decrease in the 
mark-to-market intraday return of market orders. The results are similar for the 1-day and 
5-day returns. For institutional investors, we do not observe a significant relationship between 
market order returns and submission ratio at “X0.” The results indicate that the 
underperformance of individual investors with low cognitive abilities is not restricted to their 
limit orders.   
 5.3.3 Cognitive Limitation and Performance of Round-Trip Trades 
We follow Jordan and Diltz (2003) and Feng and Seasholes (2005) to calculate round-trip 
trade performance. A round-trip trade is identified as a newly initiated position, long or short, 
being covered. To adjust for the cross-sectional variation in round-trip duration, and to 
facilitate the comparison with the mark-to-market returns of executed orders, we focus on the 
round-trip daily profit and daily index returns for the investors.  
The round-trip profit is calculated as the number of index points earned or lost times 200 
(50) TWD for the TXF (MXF) contracts. The round-trip index return is calculated as the 
profit divided by the mean execution price of all buy orders within a round-trip trade.19 We 
then calculate an investor’s round-trip daily profit (index return) as the average round-trip 
profit (index return) divided by the average round-trip duration. 20  Similar to the 
mark-to-market returns, all items are first calculated for each investor and then averaged with 
equal weights for each quintile.  
                                                             
19 A round-trip trade may contain several buys and sells before the position is back to zero. 
20 The outlier problem can be severe if we calculate the daily performance per round-trip. Many round-trip trades 
have a very short duration, leading to extremely large daily profits and daily index returns for those round-trip 
trades. Therefore, we first calculate the average round-trip duration and average profit for each investor, and then 
we calculate the investor’s daily profit as average round-trip profit divided by average duration. Round-trip daily 
index returns are calculated in the same way. To exclude extreme outliers, we also truncate the sample by deleting 
the investors with round-trip daily profits out of the 0.5% to 99.5% range in our sample. 
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Panel A of Table 8 shows that the Q5 individual investors underperform Q1 individual 
investors by 997 TWD for daily profits. The realized underperformance in terms of round-trip 
daily index returns is about 10.2 basis points per trading day. To have a better picture of the 
economic losses, we estimate the total realized profit for each investor in each quintile per 
year (multiplying rows 1, 3, and 4 in Table 8). The Q5 individual investors lose 85,255 TWD 
(2,600 USD) more than their Q1 counterparts per year during our sample period. These 
incremental losses of Q5 individual investors are not driven by their excessive trading, as 
Barber and Odean (2000) suggest. In fact, Q5 investors trade less than their counterparts. This 
is in line with our hypothesis that the inferior performance of Q5 individual investors is 
mainly driven by their cognitive limitations. The pattern is similar for institutional investors, 
with a lower statistical significance due to a smaller sample size.  
Table 8 also shows that investors tend to have a shorter duration for the winning 
round-trip trades and a longer duration for the losing ones, which indicates that investors are 
affected by the disposition effect when making their investments, as shown in Odean (1998). 
Therefore, we control for the disposition effect to single out the effect of cognitive limitations 
on investment performance when we conduct the multivariate regression analysis. 
The last two columns of Table 9 present the results of multivariate regressions for the 
round-trip trades. The coefficients of the submission ratio at “X0” are significantly negative 
for individual investors. A one standard deviation increase in the submission ratio at “X0” 
(18.1%) leads to a lower (269 TWD) round-trip daily profit and a lower (2.93 basis points) 
daily index return. We do not find similar results for institutional investors after controlling 
for the number of orders submitted in the previous year and the disposition effect.  
In summary, the inferior performance of Q5 individual investors (those with lower 
cognitive abilities) due to their round-numbered limit orders, non-round-numbered limit 
orders, market orders, and round-trip trades corroborate our Hypothesis 2 that individual 
investors with lower cognitive capabilities perform worse than those with higher cognitive 
 30 
 
abilities. These results also help to rule out the alternative “pay-for-cognitive-shortcut” 
hypothesis.21 
 5.4 Cognitive Limitation and Investors’ Market Timing Ability 
In this sub-section, we adopt the transaction-based calendar-time (TBCT) portfolio 
approach from Seasholes and Zhu (2010) as an alternative methodology to test investment 
performance in the dimension of market timing ability. This methodology allows us to address 
the concern of cross-sectional correlation in the investor-year panel, on top of the 
block-bootstrapping used in the panel regressions.  
For each day, we sort the investors who trade a specific product into deciles according to 
their limit order submission ratios at “X0” in the previous year. We then examine whether 
investors with lower cognitive abilities have lower market timing abilities; that is, whether 
they take more long positions when the market is up and more short positions when the 
market is down. Specifically, we perform the following panel regression: 
 
𝐵𝑆𝐵𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑠,𝑡,𝑖,𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑖𝑅 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑁𝐷𝑠,𝑡,𝑖 + 𝛽2 𝑆𝑆𝐷𝑅_𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑋0,𝑠,𝑡−1,𝑖 +
𝛽3(𝑆𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑁𝐷𝑠,𝑡,𝑖 × 𝑆𝑆𝐷𝑅_𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑋0,𝑠,𝑡−1,𝑖) + 𝜀𝑠,𝑡,𝑖,𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑖𝑅                               (4)  
 
𝐵𝑆𝐵𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑠,𝑡,𝑖,𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑅_𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑖𝑅 is calculated in two different ways. In Model 1, we calculate it as 
the number of buy contracts scaled by the total number of contracts executed. In Model 2, we 
calculate it as the difference between the numbers of buy and sell contracts, divided by the 
average of the two. 𝑆𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑁𝐷𝑠,𝑡,𝑖 is the market return of product i at day s of year t. Both limit 
and market orders are included in this analysis. 𝑆𝑆𝐷𝑅_𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑋0,𝑠,𝑡−1,𝑖 is the decile rank 
of investors trading product i at day s, classified by their limit order submission ratio at “X0” 
                                                             
21 One may be concerned that the negative correlation between the submission ratio at “X0” and investment 
performance is driven by the skewness of the performance. Boyer, Mitton, and Vorkink (2010) show that expected 
idiosyncratic skewness and returns are negatively correlated. If skewness is also positively correlated with 
investors’ propensity to submit limit orders at round-number prices, it would also be consistent with our findings. 
However, we find that the skewness of investment performance is significantly negatively correlated with the 
submission ratio at “X0.” This rules out the concern that our result is driven by the interaction of skewness 
preference and order submission behavior. 
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at year t-1, with decile 10 representing the highest round-numbered submission ratio For each 
year t, each day s, and each product i, we sort investors trading that product into deciles based 
on their submission ratio at “X0” in the previous year t-1. Product i could be the MXF or TXF 
orders that expire in one month, two months, three months, six months, nine months, or one 
year. To ensure a reasonable submission ratio at “X0”, we require that investors submit at 
least 10 limit orders in two consecutive years. The parameter of interest is 𝛽3, which captures 
the relative market-timing capabilities of investors with higher submission ratios at “X0.”  
 Table 10 reports a significantly negative 𝛽3 for both the limit and market order trades of 
individual investors. In other words, individual investors with lower cognitive abilities take 
fewer long positions when the market return is positive, compared with those exhibiting 
higher cognitive abilities. This implies lower market timing skills among investors with lower 
cognitive abilities. A similar pattern can be found for institutional investors.  
 Collectively, the analyses on the investment returns and the market timing ability are 
supportive of our argument that investors with lower cognitive abilities, defined by higher 
submission ratios at round numbers, have inferior investment performance. 
 
6. Trading Experience Mitigates Cognitive Limitation 
In this section, we examine how trading experience, in terms of both past trading 
frequency and past trading returns, affect investors’ cognitive limitations. We perform the 
following regression: 
 
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑋0,𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑋0,𝑖,𝑡−1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐿𝐷�𝑁𝑖,𝑡−1� + 𝛽2 𝑆𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑁𝐷𝑋0,𝑖,𝑡−1                                                                      +𝛽3 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑋0,𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽4 𝐷𝑆𝑜𝐷𝑆𝑜𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡        (5)  
 
where 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑋0,𝑖,𝑡   and 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑋0,𝑖,𝑡−1 are investor i’s submission ratio at “X0” price 
point in the current and previous year (X is an integer ranging from 0 to 9). The differences in 
the submission ratios over the two consecutive years measure the extent to which investors 
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become less affected by the round-number heuristics through learning. 𝐿𝐷�𝑁𝑖,𝑡−1� is the 
logged number of limit orders submitted in the previous year, which is a proxy for learning 
from the past trading frequency, similar to that used in Feng and Seasholes (2005) and Dhar 
and Zhu (2006). If investors become more sophisticated after learning from their past trading, 
they are less likely to rely on the round-number heuristics when submitting their limit orders. 
The coefficient 𝛽1 is thus expected to be negative.  𝑆𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑁𝐷𝑋0,𝑖,𝑡−1 is the mark-to-market 
intraday limit order return, which is a proxy for the reinforcement learning in the same spirit 
as that found in Strahilevitz, Odean, and Barber (2011) and Chiang, Hirshleifer, Qian, and 
Sherman (2011). If investors learn through reinforcement, positive past round-numbered limit 
order returns should result in more subsequent round-numbered limit order submissions. The 
coefficient 𝛽2 is thus expected to be positive. 𝐷𝑆𝑜𝐷𝑆𝑜𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐷𝑖,𝑡 is the difference between the 
durations of losing and winning round-trips, divided by the average of the two. To ensure a 
reasonable submission ratio at “X0”, we require investors to submit at least 10 limit orders in 
two consecutive years.  
Panel A of Table 11 shows that the change in the submission ratio at round numbers is 
negatively related to the number of limit orders submitted in the previous year for individual 
investors. The coefficients for 𝐿𝐷�𝑁𝑖,𝑡−1� are significantly negative at the 1% significance 
level for both Models 1 and 3. Specifically, according to the estimated coefficient in Model 3, 
a one standard deviation increase in the number of limit orders submitted in the previous year 
(51) will reduce the submission ratio at round numbers by 2% in the subsequent year. This 
indicates that individual investors learn from their past trading frequency and become less 
reliant on the round-number heuristics in their subsequent limit order submissions, which is 
consistent with our Hypothesis 3a.  
However, the coefficient 𝛽2  for  𝑆𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑁𝐷𝑋0,𝑖,𝑡−1  is less robust and becomes 
insignificant after incorporating the past trading frequency into the regression. The 
round-numbered limit order submission ratio of individual investors does not seem to be 
materially affected by their previous round-numbered limit order performance, which is not 
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supportive of our Hypothesis 3b on reinforcement learning.  
Panel B of Table 11 shows that for institutional investors, both past trading frequency and 
past trading returns help to reduce their limit order submission at the round numbers. The 
results are again supportive of our Hypothesis 3a but not of our Hypothesis 3b.  
 
7. Cross-Market Analysis, Longer-term Investment Performance, and 
Robustness Check 7.1 Cross-Market Analysis 
To further validate the association between cognitive limitation and investment 
performance, we examine the two following questions: First, do investors with a higher limit 
order submission ratio at round numbers in the futures market also submit more 
round-numbered limit orders in their options trading? Second, and more importantly, is 
cognitive limitation, revealed in the futures market, also associated with options investment 
performance? 
In TAIFEX, one investor account can be used to trade both futures and options. With the 
account identification, we construct a subset of investors who trade in both the futures and 
options markets during our sample period. We perform two separate regressions to investigate 
the limit order clustering phenomenon and investor performance in the options market: 
 
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑋0,𝑖,𝑡,𝑅𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑅𝑖𝑠  𝑆𝑁  𝑆𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑁𝐷𝑖,𝑡,𝑅𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑅𝑖𝑠 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑋0,𝑖,𝑡,𝑓𝑅𝑡𝑅𝑓𝑓𝑠 +
𝛽2𝐿𝐷�𝑁𝑖,𝑡−1,𝑅𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑅𝑖𝑠� + 𝛽3 𝐷𝑆𝑜𝐷𝑆𝑜𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐷𝑖,𝑡,𝑅𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑅𝑖𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                                     (6)   
 
where 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑋0,𝑖,𝑡,𝑅𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑅𝑖𝑠 is investor i’s options limit order submission ratio at round 
numbers in year t-1. The options tick size in TAIFEX depends on the transaction prices, and 
we therefore define “options round-number prices” as the options prices that are multiples of 
the tick sizes times 10. A detailed description of the tick sizes is displayed in Table B5 of 
Internet Appendix B. 𝑆𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑁𝐷𝑖,𝑡,𝑅𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑅𝑖𝑠 is investor i’s mark-to-market returns or round-trip 
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performance in the options market at year t.  𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑋0,𝑖,𝑡,𝑓𝑅𝑡𝑅𝑓𝑓𝑠 is investor i’s futures 
limit order submission ratio at “X0” price point in year t-1 (X is an integer ranging from 0 to 
9). 𝐿𝐷�𝑁𝑖,𝑡−1,𝑅𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑅𝑖𝑠� is the logged number of options limit orders submitted in year t-1. 
𝐷𝑆𝑜𝐷𝑆𝑜𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐷𝑖,𝑡,𝑅𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑅𝑖𝑠 is the disposition effect in the options market, which is calculated as 
the difference between the durations of losing and winning round-trips, divided by the 
average of the two. To be included in the regression, an investor must submit at least 10 
futures limit orders and 10 options limit orders for both of the two consecutive years. This 
sub-set of investors submits about 63 million options limit orders, which accounts for about 
26% of the total options limit orders in TAIFEX. 
The results are reported in Table B6 of Internet Appendix B. Individual investors with 
higher round-numbered limit order submission ratios in the futures market also have higher 
round-numbered limit order submission ratios in the options market. Likewise, they have 
lower investment performance in their options limit orders, market orders, and round-trip 
trades. This sub-sample analysis indicates that cognitively constrained investors behave and 
perform similarly across markets. Collectively, the cognitive limitation we identify from the 
limit order submission at round numbers in the index futures market is most likely to be an 
investor’s trait, which is related to her investment performance and can be carried over to 
various markets. 
 7.2 Cognitive Limitation and Longer-term Investment Performance 
In this subsection, we perform regression analysis for longer-term mark-to-market 
returns and average monthly profit. The longer-term mark-to-market returns for limit and 
market orders are calculated in three different variations: a) from the submission to 22 trading 
days afterwards, b) from the submission to the end of the calendar month, and c) from the 
submission to the expiration day (the third Wednesday of the expiration month). The average 
monthly profit is the average profit per contract from a series of transactions conducted over 
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the course of a month, where the unclosed position is assumed to be closed out at the closing 
price by the end of the month.  
Table B7 of Internet Appendix B shows that, for individual investors, submission ratio at 
“X0” is negatively associated with longer-term mark-to-market returns and average monthly 
profit. The parameter estimates for limit and market orders are comparable to each other. 
Table B8 of Internet Appendix B reports the results on mark-to-market returns of limit 
orders submitted at “X0” and non-“X0” prices. It shows that the negative association of 
cognitive limitation and longer-term investment performance exists for both round-numbered 
and non-round-numbered limit orders. 
 7.3 Robustness Check 
In the previous analysis, we exclude investors who submit fewer than 10 limit orders in 
two consecutive years and construct the limit order submission ratio based on the proportion 
of limit orders submitted at multiples of 10. To make sure that our results are not driven by the 
filtering criteria and how we define the limit order submission ratio at round numbers, we 
check whether our results remain when we require investors to submit more than five (or 
fifteen) limit orders in two consecutive years, and when we construct the limit order 
submission ratio at multiples of 100 or at multiples of 50. 
Table B9 of Internet Appendix B shows that when we require investors to submit more 
than five or fifteen limit orders in two years, individual investors with high submission ratios 
at round numbers still significantly underperform their counterparts in their round-numbered 
limit orders, non-round-numbered limit orders, market orders, and round-trip trades. The 
underperformance remains significant irrespective of using multiples of 100, 50, or 10 as the 
round numbers. This indicates that the main results from previous sections are robust to the 
different sample filtering criteria and the various definitions of round numbers. 
 
8. Conclusion 
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This paper investigates whether cognitive limitation is associated with investors’ limit 
order submission behavior and performance. We document a strong and persistent limit order 
clustering pattern in the Taiwan Futures Exchange among individual investors. The limit order 
clustering at multiples of 100 is the strongest, followed by those at multiples of 50 and 10. 
Individual investors rely more on round-number heuristics; they submit 4.1% of their orders 
at prices that are multiples of 100. For institutional investors, the limit order clustering 
phenomenon is less significant, with only 1.6% of limit orders submitted at prices that are 
multiples of 100. The result also shows a large cross-sectional heterogeneity in the submission 
ratios at round-number prices.  
We find a negative relationship between cognitive limitation and investor performance. 
Individual investors with lower cognitive abilities, defined by a higher submission ratio at 
round numbers, experience significantly lower intraday, 1-day, and 5-day returns. The 
underperformance appears for limit orders submitted at both round-numbered and 
non-round-number prices, for market orders, and for realized round-trips. Investors behave in 
a similar fashion in the options market. Investors with lower cognitive abilities also exhibit 
inferior longer-term investment performance. 
Our findings suggest that for individual investors who are cognitively constrained, 
trading on their own could result in poor investment performance. One way that individual 
investors can self-check whether they are cognitively constrained is by looking at their 
submission ratio at round-number prices. That being said, we also find that the number of 
limit orders submitted in the previous year helps to reduce individual investors’ propensity to 
submit limit orders with round-number prices. Learning by trading more frequently mitigates 
individual investors’ reliance on the round-number heuristics and improves their future 
investment decisions. 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics of Limit Order Quotes and Trades  Panel A: Number of Limit Orders Submitted 
Year Total Investor type Product type 
    Individual Institutional MXF TXF 
2003 8,391,970  7,874,288  517,682  2,460,478  5,931,492  
2004 11,756,902  10,436,137  1,320,765  3,821,759  7,935,143  
2005 9,336,187  7,171,025  2,165,162  2,482,810  6,853,377  
2006 16,080,187  10,088,540  5,991,647  4,943,571  11,136,616  
2007 26,218,095  13,297,493  12,920,602  10,489,454  15,728,641  
2008 36,699,943  18,251,513  18,448,430  14,855,950  21,843,993  
      Total 108,483,284  67,118,996  41,364,288  39,054,022  69,429,262  
Ratio 100.00% 61.87% 38.13% 36.00% 64.00%  Panel B: Number of Limit Order Contracts Submitted 
Year Total Investor type Product type 
    Individual Institutional MXF TXF 
2003 19,945,949  16,859,030  3,086,919  3,411,265  16,534,684  
2004 30,930,065  22,720,915  8,209,150  6,600,858  24,329,207  
2005 28,661,053  18,980,375  9,680,678  4,953,050  23,708,003  
2006 50,802,391  25,136,643  25,665,748  14,261,405  36,540,986  
2007 88,136,766  27,900,386  60,236,380  38,522,631  49,614,135  
2008 103,837,651  32,290,826  71,546,825  46,157,645  57,680,006  
      Total 322,313,875  143,888,175  178,425,700  113,906,854  208,407,021  
Ratio 100.00% 44.64% 55.36% 35.34% 64.66%  Panel C: Number of Limit Order Contracts Executed 
Year Total Investor type Product type 
    Individual Institutional MXF TXF 
2003 11,873,156  9,783,808  2,089,348  1,886,517  9,986,639  
2004 16,906,816  12,754,376  4,152,440  2,875,775  14,031,041  
2005 13,243,799  8,893,996  4,349,803  1,656,836  11,586,963  
2006 18,869,565  12,509,174  6,360,391  2,588,846  16,280,719  
2007 23,168,312  14,571,645  8,596,667  4,311,353  18,856,959  
2008 27,763,746  18,418,047  9,345,699  8,095,657  19,668,089  
      Total 111,825,394  76,931,046  34,894,348  21,414,984  90,410,410  
Ratio 100.00% 68.80% 31.20% 19.15% 80.85% 
 
This table reports the summary statistics of the limit orders quotes and trades for two major Taiwan index futures 
in the Taiwan Futures Exchange from January 2003 to September 2008. In 2008, we only have orders and trades 
data from January to September. The number of limit orders submitted, the number of limit order contracts 
submitted, and the number of limit order contracts executed is reported in Panel A, B, and C, respectively. The 
number of limit orders (contracts) is reported separately for individual investors and institutional investors, and for 
Taiwan Stock Exchange Futures (TXF) and Mini-Taiwan Stock Exchange Futures (MXF). 
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Table 2. Limit Order Clustering at Round Number Prices 
 
Independent Parameter Estimates 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
        Intercept -0.001*** -0.002*** -0.001*** -0.002*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
𝐷00 0.021*** 0.017*** 0.010*** 0.013*** 0.010*** 0.019*** 0.011*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
𝐷50 0.014*** 0.013*** 0.005*** 0.011*** 0.005*** 0.013*** 0.006***  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 𝐷𝑋0 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.004*** 0.008*** 0.004*** 0.008*** 0.004*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
𝐷00×𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
  
0.022*** 
 
0.020*** 
 
0.019*** 
   
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
𝐷50×𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
  
0.018*** 
 
0.015*** 
 
0.015*** 
   
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
𝐷𝑋0×𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
  
0.010*** 
 
0.008*** 
 
0.008*** 
   
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
𝐷00×𝐷𝑀𝑋𝑀 
   
0.006 
 
-0.011** -0.003 
    
(0.212) 
 
(0.022) (0.510) 
𝐷50×𝐷𝑀𝑋𝑀 
   
0.004 
 
-0.007** -0.000 
    
(0.315) 
 
(0.020) (0.992) 
𝐷𝑋0×𝐷𝑀𝑋𝑀 
   
0.002*** 
 
-0.004*** 0.000 
    
(0.004) 
 
(0.000) (0.623) 
𝐷00×𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖×𝐷𝑀𝑋𝑀 
    
0.005** 0.025*** 0.007 
     
(0.034) (0.000) (0.117) 
𝐷50×𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖×𝐷𝑀𝑋𝑀 
    
0.006*** 0.020*** 0.006** 
     
(0.001) (0.000) (0.043) 
𝐷𝑋0×𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖×𝐷𝑀𝑋𝑀 
    
0.003*** 0.011*** 0.003*** 
     
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
𝐷𝑆𝑜𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝑁𝑋𝑋 
 
0.962** -0.100 1.248*** -0.014 0.210 -0.096 
  
(0.012) (0.458) (0.000) (0.917) (0.435) (0.483) 
        Number of obs. 2,400 2,400 2,400 2,400 2,400 2,400 2,400 
Adjusted R2 0.553 0.564 0.741 0.572 0.750 0.684 0.750 
        𝐷00-𝐷𝑋0 0.012*** 0.008*** 0.06** 0.005** 0.006** 0.009*** 0.007*** 
 
(0.000) (0.004) (0.013) (0.011) (0.019) (0.000) (0.000) 
𝐷50-𝐷𝑋0 0.005*** 0.004** 0.001** 0.003* 0.003 0.005** 0.002** 
 
(0.009) (0.020) (0.223) (0.099) (0.239) (0.048) (0.013) 
𝐷00-𝐷50 0.007** 0.004 0.005** 0.004 0.002 0.006** 0.005*** 
 
(0.047) (0.277) (0.082) (0.691) (0.102) (0.079) (0.003) 
  
This table reports the parameter estimates of the following regression: 
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑋𝑋 − 0.01 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐷00 + 𝛽2𝐷50 + 𝛽3𝐷𝑋0 + 𝛽4𝐷00 × 𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽5𝐷50 × 𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽6𝐷𝑋0 × 𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽7𝐷00 × 𝐷𝑀𝑋𝑀+ 𝛽8𝐷50 × 𝐷𝑀𝑋𝑀 + 𝛽9𝐷𝑋0 × 𝐷𝑀𝑋𝑀 + 𝛽10𝐷00 × 𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 × 𝐷𝑀𝑋𝑀 + 𝛽11𝐷50 × 𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 × 𝐷𝑀𝑋𝑀 + 𝛽12𝐷𝑋0× 𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 × 𝐷𝑀𝑋𝑀 + 𝐷𝑆𝑜𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝑁𝑋𝑋 + 𝜀𝑋𝑋 
The dependent variable is the deviation of the actual submission ratio at “XY” price point from its theoretical value 
assuming uniform distribution of the limit order prices (X and Y are integer numbers ranging from 0 to 9). Each 
Year, submission ratios are calculated separately for individual and institutional investors and for MXF and TXF 
orders. 𝐷00, 𝐷50, and 𝐷𝑋0 are dummy variables for price points “00,” “50”, and “X0” ( X≠0 , 5). 𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 and 
𝐷𝑀𝑋𝑀 are indicators for orders submitted by individual investors and for Mini-Taiwan Stock Exchange Futures 
orders, respectively. 𝐷𝑆𝑜𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝑁𝑋𝑋 is the average distance of limit order price from the last trade price for limit 
orders submitted at “XY” price points. For each limit order, the distance is calculated as the absolute difference 
between the limit order price and the last trade price scaled by the last trade price. In the last three rows we report 
results for the F-tests for 𝛽1 = 𝛽2 = 𝛽3. *, **, and *** indicate significance levels of 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01, 
respectively.
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Table 3. Submission Ratio at “X0” and Investors’ Descriptive Statistics in Two Consecutive Years 
 Panel A: Individual Investors 
Quintile Ranks Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Diff (Q5-Q1) p-value 
Number of investor-year obs. 30,675 30,872 30,820 30,660 30,803 
   
Statistics in the previous year      
  Number of limit orders submitted 417 252 175 139 110 
  Number of limit order contracts submitted 1,074 693 351 243 212 
  Number of limit order contracts executed 509 391 195 138 101 
  Limit order submission ratio at "X0" 0.092 0.193 0.286 0.403 0.625 
  Execution ratio 0.861 0.893 0.875 0.844 0.762 
 
 
Time-to-execute (s) 400 318 389 522 863 
 
 
 
Statistics in the current year    
 
 
  Number of limit orders submitted 462 293 196 158 131   
Number of limit order contracts submitted 1,193 790 385 266 240   
Number of limit contracts executed 545 442 225 155 122   
Limit order submission ratio at "X0" 0.145 0.229 0.301 0.389 0.550 0.405***   0.000 
Execution ratio 0.870 0.896 0.882 0.855 0.793 -0.077***   0.000 
Time-to-execute (s) 375 314 379 482 747 372***   0.000 
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 Panel B: Institutional Investors 
Quintile Ranks Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Diff (Q5-Q1) p-value 
Number of investor-year obs. 466 470 467 474 464 
   
Statistics in the previous year      
  Number of limit orders submitted 29,788 15,332 974 320 346 
  Number of limit order contracts submitted 137,889 71,065 6,107 1,763 1,144 
  Number of limit order contracts executed 22,414 22,309 4,307 1,174 820 
  Limit order submission ratio at "X0" 0.083 0.146 0.201 0.298 0.524 
  Execution ratio 0.899 0.930 0.916 0.900 0.842 
 
 
Time-to-execute (s) 266 190 219 282 484 
 
 
 
Statistics in the current year    
 
 
  Number of limit orders submitted 42,376 36,093 973 2,272 526   
Number of limit order contracts submitted 164,611 176,016 5,576 7,560 1,983   
Number of limit contracts executed 24,724 30,536 4,142 1,209 1,364   
Limit order submission ratio at "X0" 0.143 0.181 0.224 0.287 0.403 0.260***   0.000 
Execution ratio 0.916 0.941 0.922 0.912 0.869 -0.047***   0.000 
Time-to-execute (s) 240 170 207 223 402 162***   0.001  
In this table we sort investors into quintiles by their limit order submission ratio at “X0” in the previous year, and report the descriptive statistics for the investor-year pair with two consecutive 
years limit order submission history (X is an integer ranging from 0 to 9). Quintile-5 (Q5) investors have the highest submission ratio. Execution ratio is the proportion of contracts executed for 
undeleted limit orders. Time-to-execute is the interval between the order submission time and the execution time for all executed limit order contracts. All items are first calculated for each 
investor-year observation and then averaged up in each quintile. Results for individual and institutional investors are reported separately. To ensure reasonable submission ratio at “X0”, we 
require that investors must submit at least 10 limit orders in each of the two consecutive years. The Satterthwaite p-value assumes unequal variances of investor performance in quintiles 1 and 5. 
*, **, and *** indicate significance levels of 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively. 
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Table 4. Submission Ratio at “X0” and Mark-to-market Return of Limit Orders 
 Panel A: Individual Investors 
Quintile Ranks Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Diff (Q5-Q1) p-value 
Intraday return (%) -0.068 -0.077 -0.085 -0.097 -0.107 -0.039***   0.000 
1-day return (%) -0.095 -0.110 -0.124 -0.144 -0.167 -0.072***   0.000 
5-day return (%) -0.147 -0.188 -0.222 -0.250 -0.290 -0.143***   0.000 
 Panel B: Institutional Investors 
Quintile Ranks Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Diff (Q5-Q1) p-value 
Intraday return (%) 0.019 0.020 0.016 -0.014 -0.062 -0.081***   0.000 
1-day return (%) -0.036 0.048 0.047 -0.055 -0.090 -0.054   0.230 
5-day return (%) -0.006 0.023 0.106 -0.022 -0.284 -0.278***   0.004  
In this table we sort investors into quintiles by their limit order submission ratio at “X0” in the previous year, and report the descriptive statistics for the investor-year pair with two consecutive 
years limit order submission history (X is an integer ranging from 0 to 9). Quintile-5 (Q5) investors have the highest submission ratio. Execution ratio is the proportion of contracts executed for 
undeleted limit orders. Time-to-execute is the interval between the order submission time and the execution time for all executed limit order contracts. All items are first calculated for each 
investor-year observation and then averaged up in each quintile. Results for individual and institutional investors are reported separately. To ensure reasonable submission ratio at “X0”, we 
require that investors must submit at least 10 limit orders in each of the two consecutive years. The Satterthwaite p-value assumes unequal variances of investor performance in quintiles 1 and 5. 
*, **, and *** indicate significance levels of 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively.   
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Table 5. Submission Ratio at “X0” and Mark-to-market Return of Limit Orders Submitted at “X0” Prices and Non-“X0” Prices 
 Panel A: Individual Investors 
Quintile Ranks Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Diff (Q5-Q1) p-value 
Performance of limit orders submitted at "X0" prices 
Intraday return (%) -0.052 -0.078 -0.085 -0.097 -0.114 -0.062***   0.000 
1-day return (%) -0.068 -0.108 -0.122 -0.139 -0.173 -0.105***   0.000 
5-day return (%) -0.101 -0.167 -0.201 -0.250 -0.308 -0.207***   0.000 
 
Performance of limit orders submitted at non-"X0" prices 
Intraday return (%) -0.069 -0.075 -0.084 -0.095 -0.095 -0.026***   0.000 
1-day return (%) -0.097 -0.111 -0.123 -0.143 -0.158 -0.061***   0.000 
5-day return (%) -0.151 -0.196 -0.218 -0.236 -0.259 -0.108***   0.000  Panel B: Institutional Investors 
Quintile Ranks Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Diff (Q5-Q1) p-value 
Performance of limit orders submitted at "X0" prices 
Intraday return (%) 0.019 0.064 0.018 0.032 -0.058 -0.077**   0.014 
1-day return (%) -0.049 0.079 0.096 0.108 0.004     0.054   0.406 
5-day return (%) -0.011 0.025 -0.017 0.082 -0.200     -0.190   0.163 
 
Performance of limit orders submitted at non-"X0" prices 
Intraday return (%) 0.022 0.011 0.019 -0.028 -0.044  -0.066**   0.017 
1-day return (%) -0.033 0.029 0.014 -0.105 -0.112     -0.080   0.125 
5-day return (%) -0.008 0.027 0.097 -0.045 -0.345   -0.337***   0.002 
 
In this table we sort investors into quintiles by their limit order submission ratio at “X0” in the previous year, and report the current year’s performance of limit orders separately for those 
submitted at “X0” prices and non-“X0” prices (X is an integer ranging from 0 to 9). Quintile-5 (Q5) investors have the highest submission ratio. Mark-to-market intraday returns of limit orders 
are the difference between execution price and the same day’s closing price divided by the execution price. 1-day and 5-day index returns are defined similarly. Only initiating limit orders are 
included into this calculation. All items are first calculated for each investor-year pair and then averaged up in each quintile. Results for individual and institutional investors are reported 
separately. To ensure reasonable submission ratio at “X0”, we require that investors must submit at least 10 limit orders in each of the two consecutive years. The Satterthwaite p-value assumes 
unequal variances of investor performance in quintiles 1 and 5. *, **, and *** indicate significance levels of 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively. 
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Table 6. Number of “XY”s Where Investors with Least Cognitive Abilities 
Underperform 
 Panel A: Individual Investors 
Significance Number of price points where Quintile-5 investors underperform Quintile-1 investors 
Level Intraday return 1-day return 5-day return 
p≤1 98 99 98 
p<0.1 91 94 86 
p<0.05 89 88 79 
p<0.01 86 83 69 
 Panel B: Institutional Investors 
Significance Number of price points where Quintile-5 investors underperform Quintile-1 investors 
Level Intraday return 1-day return 5-day return 
p≤1 44 33 80 
p<0.1 27 17 65 
p<0.05 22 17 60 
p<0.01 17 14 52  
In this table, we sort investors into quintiles based on their limit order submission ratio at “X0” in the previous year, 
and report the number of “XY”s where Quintile-5 investors (significantly) underperform Quintile-1 investors in 
the current year (X and Y are integers ranging from 0 to 9). The underperformance is determined by looking at the 
intraday, 1-day, as well as 5-day mark-to-market return of limit orders. The intraday mark-to-market return for 
limit orders is defined as the difference between execution price and the same day’s closing price divided by the 
execution price. 1-day and 5-day index returns are defined similarly. Only initiating limit orders are included into 
this calculation. The significance level is indicated by Satterthwaite p-value, which assumes unequal variances of 
investor performance in quintile 1 and 5. To ensure reasonable submission ratio at “X0”, we require that investors 
must submit at least 10 limit orders in each of the two consecutive years. 
 
  
 49 
 
Table 7. Submission Ratio at “X0” and Mark-to-market Return of Market Orders 
 Panel A: Individual Investors 
Quintile Ranks Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Diff (Q5-Q1) p-value 
Intraday return (%) -0.022 -0.047 -0.053 -0.053 -0.071 -0.049***   0.000 
1-day return (%) -0.052 -0.080 -0.095 -0.104 -0.131 -0.079***   0.000 
5-day return (%) -0.105 -0.173 -0.204 -0.212 -0.223 -0.119***   0.000 
 Panel B: Institutional Investors 
Quintile Ranks Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Diff (Q5-Q1) p-value 
Intraday return (%) -0.055 0.033 0.010 -0.041 -0.074  -0.019   0.692 
1-day return (%) -0.122 -0.141 -0.020 -0.053 -0.067   0.055   0.616 
5-day return (%) -0.151 -0.243 0.037 0.236 -0.132   0.019   0.930 
 
In this table we sort investors into quintiles by their limit order submission ratio at “X0” in the previous year, and report the mark-to-market intraday, 1-day and 5-day returns of market orders in 
the current year (X is an integer ranging from 0 to 9). Quintile-5 (Q5) investors have the highest submission ratio. Mark-to-market intraday returns of market orders are the difference between 
execution price and the same day’s closing price divided by the execution price. 1-day and 5-day index returns are defined similarly. Only initiating market orders are included into this 
calculation. All items are first calculated for each investor-year pair and then averaged up in each quintile. Results for individual and institutional investors are reported separately. To ensure 
reasonable submission ratio at “X0”, we require that investors must submit at least 10 limit orders in each of the two consecutive years. The Satterthwaite p-value assumes unequal variances of 
investor performance in quintiles 1 and 5. *, **, and *** indicate significance levels of 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively.  
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Table 8. Submission Ratio at “X0” and the Performance of Round-trip Trades 
 Panel A: Individual Investors 
Quintile Ranks Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Diff (Q5-Q1) p-value 
Daily profit (TWD) -1,045 -1,930 -2,148 -2,301 -2,042 -997***   0.000 
Daily index return (%) -0.078 -0.164 -0.189 -0.209 -0.180 -0.102***   0.000 
Number of round-trips 73 63 53 44 37 -36***   0.000 
Round-trip duration (day) 2.128 2.115 2.335 2.578 3.277 1.149***   0.000 
Duration of winning round-trips (day) 1.739 1.750 1.977 2.137 2.670 0.932***   0.000 
Duration of losing round-trips (day) 2.925 2.882 3.103 3.460 4.429 1.504***   0.000 
 Panel B: Institutional Investors 
Quintile Ranks Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Diff (Q5-Q1) p-value 
Daily profit (TWD) 71,481 60,816 62,337 15,420 20,592 -50,888**   0.046 
Daily index return (%) 5.786 4.993 4.402 1.738 1.742 -4.044**   0.032 
Number of round-trips 95 69 44 48 29 -66***   0.003 
Round-trip duration (day) 5.087 6.146 5.432 4.510 5.002  -0.085   0.866 
Duration of winning round-trips (day) 4.816 5.783 5.221 4.372 4.927   0.112   0.835 
Duration of losing round-trips (day) 5.116 6.282 5.391 4.830 4.732  -0.384   0.427 
 
In this table we sort investors into quintiles by their limit order submission ratio at “X0” in the previous year, and report the round-trip performance in the current year (X is an integer ranging 
from 0 to 9). Quintile-5 (Q5) investors have the highest submission ratio. Round-trip duration is the number of trading days between the initiating and closing position of a round-trip. For each 
investor, we calculate the round-trip daily profit and daily index return as the average round-trip profit or index return divided by the average round-trip duration. All items are first calculated for 
each investor-year pair and then averaged up in each quintile. Results for individual and institutional investors are reported separately. To ensure reasonable submission ratio at “X0”, we require 
that investors must submit at least 10 limit orders in each of the two consecutive years. And we truncate the investors at 0.5% level on both sides by their round-trip daily profit to exclude 
outliers. The Satterthwaite p-value assumes unequal variances of investor performance in quintiles 1 and 5. *, **, and *** indicate significance levels of 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively. 
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Table 9. Panel Regression Analysis for Submission Ratio at “X0” and Investment Performance 
 Panel A: Individual Investors 
Independent Mark-to-market return of limit orders (%)   Mark-to-market return of market orders (%)   Performance of round-trip trades 
Variables Intraday return 1-day return 5-day return   Intraday return 1-day return 5-day return   Daily profit (TWD) Daily index return (%) 
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑋0,𝑖,𝑡−1 -0.051*** -0.101*** -0.208*** 
 
-0.062*** -0.117*** -0.169*** 
 
-1,486.976** -0.162*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.019) (0.001) 
 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000]  [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]  [0.038] [0.003] 
𝐿𝐷�𝑁𝑖,𝑡−1� 0.011*** 0.016*** 0.020*** 
 
0.012*** 0.016*** 0.015** 
 
1,176.185*** 0.107*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.014) 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
 
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002]  [0.002] [0.002] [0.013]  [0.006] [0.002] 
𝐷𝑆𝑜𝐷𝑆𝑜𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐷𝑖,𝑡 -0.020*** -0.050*** -0.157*** 
 
-0.015*** -0.041*** -0.123*** 
 
-4,770.539*** -0.413*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000]  [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]  [0.000] [0.000] 
Intercept -0.117*** -0.156*** -0.276*** 
 
-0.065*** -0.100*** -0.156*** 
 
-6,285.092*** -0.533*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000]  [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]  [0.001] [0.000] 
Year Fixed-effect Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
Number of obs. 146,151 146,140 145,897 
 
83,953 83,804 81,903  146,619 146,619 
Adjusted R2 0.018 0.011 0.019   0.004 0.003 0.003   0.003 0.004    
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 Panel B: Institutional Investors 
Independent Mark-to-market return of limit orders (%)   Mark-to-market return of market orders (%)   Performance of round-trip trades 
Variables Intraday return 1-day return 5-day return   Intraday return 1-day return 5-day return   Daily profit (TWD) Daily index return (%) 
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑋0,𝑖,𝑡−1 -0.204*** -0.217** -0.583*** 
 
-0.055 0.183 0.364 
 
14,061.936 2.218 
 
(0.000) (0.014) (0.003) 
 
(0.596) (0.395) (0.389) 
 
(0.820) (0.615) 
 
[0.000] [0.097] [0.004]  [0.182] [0.438] [0.103]  [0.413] [0.423] 
𝐿𝐷�𝑁𝑖,𝑡−1� -0.003 -0.003 0.002 
 
0.014* -0.001 0.057 
 
37,971.693** 3.543*** 
 
(0.459) (0.651) (0.922) 
 
(0.053) (0.939) (0.147) 
 
(0.037) (0.009) 
 
[0.164] [0.048] [0.048]  [0.024] [0.438] [0.050]  [0.138] [0.055] 
𝐷𝑆𝑜𝐷𝑆𝑜𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐷𝑖,𝑡 -0.044*** -0.101*** -0.213*** 
 
-0.006 -0.011 -0.188** 
 
-156,989.673*** -11.664*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.755) (0.810) (0.040) 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000]  [0.440] [0.082] [0.015]  [0.000] [0.000] 
Intercept 0.068 0.028 0.045 
 
0.010 0.015 0.083 
 
1,783.356 -1.789 
 
(0.108) (0.689) (0.763) 
 
(0.882) (0.921) (0.799) 
 
(0.982) (0.759) 
 
[0.116] [0.740] [0.643]  [0.044] [0.812] [0.919]  [0.582] [0.253] 
Year Fixed-effect Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
Number of obs. 2,013 2,013 2,009 
 
1,114 1,108 1,073  2,022 2,022 
Adjusted R2 0.032 0.025 0.022   0.011 0.010 0.008   0.054 0.061 
 
In this table we report the parameter estimates for the following panel regression: 𝑆𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑁𝐷𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑋0,𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2 𝐿𝐷�𝑁𝑖,𝑡−1� + 𝛽3 𝐷𝑆𝑜𝐷𝑆𝑜𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡  
where 𝑆𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑁𝐷𝑖,𝑡 is the average mark-to-market returns or round-trip performance for investor i at year t. 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑋0,𝑖,𝑡−1 is investor i’s submission ratio at “X0” price points in the previous year 
(X is an integer ranging from 0 to 9). 𝐿𝐷�𝑁𝑖,𝑡−1� is the log of number of limit orders submitted in the previous year. 𝐷𝑆𝑜𝐷𝑆𝑜𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐷𝑖,𝑡 is the difference between the current year’s duration of losing 
and winning round-trips, divided by the average of the two. Mark-to-market return of limit (market) orders is the return assuming that the initiating limit (market) orders are covered at the 
closing price of a trading day. The round-trip daily profit and daily index return are calculated as the average round-trip profit or index return divided by the average round-trip duration for each 
investor. Results for individual and institutional investors are reported separately. Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity. We also employ block-bootstrapping strategy to test the 
significance of the parameter estimates. For each year t, we select with replacement 𝑀𝑡 observations, where 𝑀𝑡 is the number of observations at year t in the original sample. We then combine 
the selected observations from 2004 to 2008 to form a new sample, perform the panel regression, and obtain the parameter estimates. We repeat this procedure 1,000 times, and report the 
empirical p-value from the block-bootstrapping strategy in brackets below the p-value from the original regression. To ensure reasonable submission ratio at “X0”, we require that investors must 
submit at least 10 limit orders in each of the two consecutive years. *, **, and *** indicate significance levels of 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively. 
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Table 10. Submission Ratio at “X0”, Market Return, and the Buy Ratio 
 Panel A: Individual Investors 
 Independent Variables Limit order contracts   Market order contracts 
 
Model 1 Model 2   Model 1 Model 2 
𝑆𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑁𝐷𝑠,𝑡,𝑖 -4.937*** -1.234***  15.360*** 3.840*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
𝑆𝑆𝐷𝑅_𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑋0,𝑠,𝑡−1,𝑖 0.027*** 0.007***  0.034*** 0.009*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
𝑆𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑁𝐷𝑠,𝑡,𝑖 × 𝑆𝑆𝐷𝑅_𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑋0,𝑠,𝑡−1,𝑖 -1.774*** -0.444***  -1.368*** -0.342*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
Intercept 0.433*** 0.608***  0.179*** 0.545*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
Number of Obs. 68,770 68,770  39,624 39,624 
Adjusted R2 0.041 0.041   0.033 0.033 
 Panel B: Institutional Investors 
 Independent Variables Limit order contracts   Market order contracts 
 
Model 1 Model 2   Model 1 Model 2 
𝑆𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑁𝐷𝑠,𝑡,𝑖 14.393*** 3.598***  20.602*** 5.150*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
𝑆𝑆𝐷𝑅_𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑋0,𝑠,𝑡−1,𝑖 0.021*** 0.005***  0.025*** 0.006*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
𝑆𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑁𝐷𝑠,𝑡,𝑖 × 𝑆𝑆𝐷𝑅_𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑋0,𝑠,𝑡−1,𝑖 -2.090*** -0.522***  -0.870*** -0.218*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000)  (0.004) (0.004) 
Intercept -0.231*** 0.442***  -0.108*** 0.473*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
Number of Obs. 32,261 32,261  14,344 14,344 
Adjusted R2 0.009 0.009   0.030 0.030 
 
In this table, we report the parameter estimates for the following panel regression: 
𝐵𝑆𝐵𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑠,𝑡,𝑖,𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑖𝑅 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑁𝐷𝑠,𝑡,𝑖 + 𝛽2 𝑆𝑆𝐷𝑅_𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑋0,𝑠,𝑡−1,𝑖 + 𝛽3(𝑆𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑁𝐷𝑠,𝑡,𝑖 × 𝑆𝑆𝐷𝑅_𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑋0,𝑠,𝑡−1,𝑖) +
𝜀𝑠,𝑡,𝑖,𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑖𝑅  
For each year t, each day s, and each product i, we sort market participants trading that product into deciles based 
on their submission ratio at “X0” in the previous year t-1 (X is an integer ranging from 0 to 9). We employ two 
specifications for the calculation of 𝐵𝑆𝐵𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑠,𝑡,𝑖,𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑅_𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑖𝑅. In Model 1, we calculate it as the number of buy 
contracts (taking long positions) scaled by total number of contracts executed. In Model 2, we calculate it as the 
difference between the numbers of buy and sell contracts, divided by the average of the two. Product i could be 
MXF or TXF orders that expire in 1 month, two months, three months, six months, nine months, or one year. 
𝑆𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑁𝐷𝑠,𝑡,𝑖 is the return of product i at day s of year t. 𝑆𝑆𝐷𝑅_𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑋0,𝑠,𝑡−1,𝑖 is the decile rank of investors trading 
product i at day s, classified by their limit order submission ratio at “X0” at year t-1. Both limit and market orders 
are included into this analysis. Results for individual and institutional investors are reported separately. To ensure 
reasonable submission ratio at “X0”, we require that investors must submit at least 10 limit orders in each of the 
two consecutive years. Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity. *, **, and *** indicate significance 
levels of 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively. 
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Table 11. Trading Experience and the Change in Submission Ratio at “X0” 
 Panel A: Individual Investors 
Independent Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
𝐿𝐷�𝑁𝑖,𝑡−1� -0.007*** 
 
-0.005*** 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
𝑆𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑁𝐷𝑋0,𝑖,𝑡−1 
 
-0.158* -0.111 
  
(0.084) (0.222) 
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑋0,𝑖,𝑡−1 -0.262*** -0.238*** -0.246*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
𝐷𝑆𝑜𝐷𝑆𝑜𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐷𝑖,𝑡 -0.001*** -0.002*** -0.001** 
 
(0.005) (0.002) (0.022) 
Intercept 0.132*** 0.093*** 0.117*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Year fixed-effect Yes Yes Yes 
Number of obs. 146,619 137,239 137,239 
Adjusted R2 0.153 0.139 0.141 
 Panel B: Institutional Investors 
Independent Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
𝐿𝐷�𝑁𝑖,𝑡−1� -0.004*** 
 
-0.003* 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.060) 
𝑆𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑁𝐷𝑋0,𝑖,𝑡−1 
 
-2.605*** -2.603*** 
  
(0.000) (0.000) 
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑋0,𝑖,𝑡−1 -0.449*** -0.416*** -0.427*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
𝐷𝑆𝑜𝐷𝑆𝑜𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐷𝑖,𝑡 0.012*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 
 
(0.002) (0.000) (0.000) 
Intercept 0.142*** 0.108*** 0.126*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Year fixed-effect Yes Yes Yes 
Number of obs. 2,022 1,894 1,894 
Adjusted R2 0.286 0.273 0.274 
 
In this table we report the parameter estimates for the following panel regression: 
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑋0,𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑋0,𝑖,𝑡−1 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐿𝐷�𝑁𝑖,𝑡−1� + 𝛽2  𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑋0,𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3 𝐷𝑆𝑜𝐷𝑆𝑜𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4 𝑆𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑁𝐷𝑋0,𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡  
where 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑋0,𝑆,𝑆  and 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑋0,𝑖,𝑡−1 are the investor i’s submission ratio at “X0” price point in the current and 
previous year (X is an integer ranging from 0 to 9). 𝐿𝐷�𝑁𝑖,𝑡−1� is natural log of the number of limit orders 
submitted in the previous year. 𝐷𝑆𝑜𝐷𝑆𝑜𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐷𝑖,𝑡 is the difference between duration of losing and winning round-trips, 
divided by the average of the two. 𝑆𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑁𝐷𝑋0,𝑖,𝑡−1 is the mark-to-market intraday return for limit orders submitted at 
“X0.” To ensure reasonable submission ratio at “X0”, we require that investors must submit at least 10 limit orders 
in each of the two consecutive years. Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity. *, **, and *** indicate 
significance levels of 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively.
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Figure 1. Limit Order Clustering at Round Number Prices 
 
  
In this figure, we report the frequency of limit orders submitted at "XY" price points (X and Y are integers ranging 
from 0 to 9). The frequency is the submission ratio at “XY” price points, calculated as the number of limit orders 
submitted at "XY" divided by the total number of limit orders submitted at all different “XY”s. We first report the 
figure for limit orders submitted by all investors, and then for limit orders submitted by individual or institutional 
investors separately. 
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Figure 2. Submission Ratio at “X0” and Mark-to-market Return for Limit Orders 
 
 
 
 
 
In this figure, we sort investors into quintiles by their limit order submission ratio at “X0” in the previous year, and 
plot the mark-to-market intraday, 1-day and 5-day returns of limit orders in the current year (X is an integer 
ranging from 0 to 9). The returns for individual and institutional limit orders are plotted in upper and lower panels, 
respectively. Quintile-5 (Q5) investors have highest submission ratio. Mark-to-market intraday returns of limit 
orders are the difference between execution price and the same day’s closing price divided by the execution price. 
1-day and 5-day index returns are defined similarly. Only initiating limit orders are included into this calculation. 
All items are first calculated for each investor-year pair and then averaged up in each quintile. Results for 
individual and institutional investors are reported separately. To ensure reasonable submission ratio at “X0”, we 
require that investors must submit at least 10 limit orders in each of the two consecutive years. 
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Internet Appendix A: Institutional Details of Taiwan Futures Exchange 
 
1. Background and Trading Rules 
 
2. Margin Rules 
 
3. Why Do Individual Investors Actively Participate in TAIFEX?  
 
4. Details of Index Futures Contracts and Index Options Contracts 
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A1: Background and Trading Rules 
 
The Taiwan Futures Exchange (TAIFEX) introduced its first product, the futures 
contracts on the Taiwan Stock Exchange Capitalization Weighted Stock Index (hereafter TXF), 
on July 21st of 1998.1 The trading of the mini version of TXF (hereafter MXF) with 
one-quarter of the margins and payoffs of TXF began on April 9th of 2001. The trading of 
index options contracts began on December 24th of 2001.  
The transactions on TAIFEX were originally matched by an automated-batch call auction 
system during the trading period from 9:00 A.M. to 12:15 P.M. The trading period was 
extended on January 1, 2001 to the hours of 8:45 A.M. to 1:45 P.M. The call auction trading 
mechanism aggregates all orders submitted to the central limit order book for 15 minutes prior 
to the market opening at 8:45 A.M., and the opening price is determined by matching the 
largest number of submitted buy and sell orders. From the opening to 1:40 P.M., buy and sell 
orders submitted during a specified time interval are batched and executed at a single clearing 
price at which all buy (sell) orders with higher (lower) limit prices than the clearing price are 
executed. When the TXF was offered to trade on TAIFEX, an electronic periodic call auction 
trading mechanism was used during regular trading hours with a 30-second delay between 
call auctions. The time delay was reduced to 20 seconds on December 4th of 1998; decreased 
further to 10 seconds on December 6th of 1999, and finally eliminated on July 29th of 2002. 
Therefore, TAIFEX operates as a continuous auction market with the market opening and 
closing call auctions from July 30th of 2002 onwards.2 During the last 5-minutes interval 
from 1:40 P.M to 1:45 P.M., orders are accumulated and are matched in a competitive call 
auction to establish the closing price at 1:45 P.M. As such, TAIFEX operates as an 
order-driven call market on a real-time basis according to price and time priority without the 
intermediation of designated market makers. 
 Investors are allowed to submit both market orders and limit orders to the Electronic 
Trading System (ETS). Market orders have higher price priority in trading than other 
marketable limit orders. An investor placing a market order to buy or sell more contracts than 
the amount currently outstanding at the best bid and ask prices would have to “walk up or 
down the book.” Orders on TAIFEX are valid only for the current trading day and would not 
be included in the limit order book on future trading days even if they are not successfully 
executed. The information about the order submissions and transactions is disseminated to the 
public on a “real-time” basis through electronic screens, with information on the last traded 
                                                             
1 During our sample period, the numbers of constituent company of the Taiwan Stock Exchange 
Capitalization Weighted Stock Index are 669, 697, 691, 688, 698, and 718 in the end of 2003, 2004, 
2005, 2006, 2007, and 2008, respectively. 
2 Note that the 5-minute call auction that was used to determine the market closing price was 
terminated on October 8th of 2007. Since then, index futures and options contracts on TAIFEX are 
traded on a continuous auction basis after the market opening. 
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price, transaction volume, the best five bid and ask prices, and the outstanding contract 
numbers waiting to be executed at these prices.  
A2: Margin Rules 
 
TAIFEX adopts a pre-margin system in which an investor is required to deposit cash as 
the initial margin in her margin account before she is able to place orders. The initial margin 
is set to cover 99 per cent of a single-day price volatility risk based on stock price movements 
within certain periods of time. The maintenance margin is normally set at around the level of 
75 per cent of initial margin. Note that the accrued interest of the deposited cash in the margin 
account does not belong to the investor. It belongs to the futures commission merchants and 
accounts for a visible portion of their operation profits. 
As shown in Figure A1, the initial margin has experienced significant fluctuation during 
our sample period spanning from January 2003 to September 2008. In January 2003, it was 
90,000 New Taiwan dollars (TWD) for a contract of TXF futures, decreased to 75,000 TWD 
in May 2003, and then fluctuated between 90,000 TWD and 120,000 TWD until February 
2007. The initial margin reached its peak 195,000 on August 22nd of 2007 to contain the 
increasing market volatility induced by the subprime financial crisis. The initial margin then 
decreased afterwards to 87,000 TWD to the end of our sample period. The initial margin for 
the MXF futures contract was set at a quarter of that for the TXF futures contract during our 
sample period. 
 
A3: Why Do Individual Investors Actively Trade in TAIFEX?  
 
Unlike index futures and options markets in the US and the Europe, individual investors 
actively trade the index futures in TAIFEX. Table I of the revised draft shows that individual 
investors account for 61.9% (68.8%) of limit orders submitted (executed). It is surprising that 
individual investors in Taiwan have such high participation in trading these derivatives. In this 
subsection, we first look into the details of both their index futures and index options trading 
to understand the main motivation for trading index futures. We then propose some 
explanations based on the existing studies and stylized facts.    
In general, the primary motivations of trading derivatives include speculation, hedging, 
and arbitrage. As investors are not required to specify the purpose of each transaction, it might 
be difficult for econometricians to accurately document how many investors are speculating, 
hedging, and arbitraging. Therefore, we try to infer investors’ trading motivations from their 
transaction records. Essentially, for example, if an investor takes a long (short) position in 
index futures and sells (buys) an index call option with the same expiration date, we argue 
that the reason for this investor to trade index futures is more likely to be arbitraging or 
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hedging. On the contrary, if an investor just takes a long or short position in index futures 
without corresponding trades in the index options in the opposite direction, this investor might 
be just speculating for this trade.  
We thus first identify index futures trades that can be matched to the index options trades 
with the same expiration dates and in the opposite trading directions from the same investor. 
We then calculate the ratio of these trades over total trades for individual and institutional 
investors separately. In the aggregate, the ratio is 35% for the individual investors and 86% 
for the institutional investors. In other words, there are 65% (14%) of individual (institutional) 
trades tend to be speculating as these trades do not have corresponding index options trades in 
the opposite directions. The result suggests that the speculation need seems to be the most 
important reason for individual investors to trade actively in TAIFEX.  
Note that investors can also hedge or arbitrage by simultaneously trading the component 
stocks of the index and the index futures (index arbitrage strategies). Unfortunately, we do not 
have the detailed stock trading record data at the account level for our index futures investors. 
Even if the account level data from the Taiwan Stock Exchange is available to us, the two 
exchanges do not use the same account identifier, which makes the matching of the accounts 
in two exchanges impossible.  
Nevertheless, index arbitrage strategies involve complicated calculation of theoretical 
prices and delicate implementation procedure to take advantage of significant deviations 
between the theoretical prices and actual prices of the index futures, the index options 
contracts, and the component stocks. This might be a difficult task for an average individual 
investor who lacks of professional knowledge of pricing derivatives contracts, sufficient 
capital to influence price movement of value stocks, and computer programs to facilitate the 
trading strategies. Although we are not able to completely rule out the possibility that some 
individual investors employ such index arbitrage or hedging strategies, we believe that such 
individual investors are relatively rare in TAIFEX.   
Next, the natural question to ask is why do individual investors speculate so much in 
TAIFEX? We propose the following reasons according to the existing literature. First, the 
index futures contracts have a quite simple payoff structure, i.e., one index point change 
representing 200 TWD gain or loss (50 TWD for mini index futures). This straightforward 
payoff structure might attract some individual investors who treat trading as a fun and 
exciting gambling activity. As Barber, Lee, Liu, and Odean (2009) and Gao and Lin (2013) 
find some individual investors in Taiwan gambling in the stock market, some investors in 
TAIFEX might also gamble in the index futures contracts. Moreover, the high and cheap 
leverage of the futures contracts might also magnify the thrill and excitement, which makes 
these contracts attractive gambles.  
Second, Kuo and Lin (2013) find that individual day traders in TAIFEX, identified ex 
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ante by initiating day-trade orders, are in general losing money. They conclude that individual 
day traders in TAIFEX are overconfident and have biased information. Their result is 
consistent with Barber, Lee, Liu, and Odean (2009) who find individual investors in the 
Taiwan stock market suffer large losses. The overconfidence, therefore, might also partially 
contribute to the high individual participation and trading in TAIFEX.  
Finally, according to Gao and Lin (2013), individual investors account for around 70% of 
total trading volume in the Taiwan stock market during 2002 to 2009. The number is similar 
to what we find in the index futures market. Individual investors in Taiwan seem to prefer 
managing their investments on their own, compared with other developed markets. 
In summary, the stylized facts that individual investors hold under-diversified portfolios 
consisting mainly small-cap stocks together with the above-mentioned analyses suggest that 
portfolio hedging or arbitraging is unlikely to be the major motivation for individual investors 
to trade actively in TAIFEX. Therefore, the speculation is the most probable trading 
motivation for these individual investors.3 And this speculation tendency might be driven by 
the gambling need, the investor overconfidence, and the preference of managing investment 
by themselves.  
 
  
                                                             
3 Our private conversation with a high-rank officer in TAIFEX is consistent with the view that 
speculation seems to be the major motivation for individual investors to actively trade index futures.  
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A4: Details of Index Futures Contracts and Index Options Contracts 
 
This subsection provides the main features of index futures, mini-index futures, and the index 
options contracts traded in TAIFEX.4 
 
Description TAIEX Futures (TXF) Mini-Index Futures (MXF) TAIEX Options (TXO) 
Location Taiwan Taiwan Taiwan 
Underlying 
asset 
Taiwan capitalization 
weighted index (TAIEX) 
Taiwan capitalization 
weighted index (TAIEX) 
Taiwan capitalization 
weighted index (TAIEX) 
Contract size NT$200 × per index point NT$50 × per index point NT$50 (per index point) 
Contract 
month 
Spot month, the next 
calendar month, and the 
next three quarterly 
months 
Spot month, the next 
calendar month, and the 
next three quarterly 
months 
Spot month, the next two 
calendar months, and the 
next two quarterly months 
 
Trading hours  08:45AM-1:45PM 
Taiwan time Monday 
through Friday of the 
regular business days of 
the Taiwan Stock 
Exchange 
 08:45AM-1:30PM on 
the last trading day for 
the delivery month 
contract 
 08:45AM-1:45PM 
Taiwan time Monday 
through Friday of the 
regular business days of 
the Taiwan Stock 
Exchange 
 08:45AM-1:30PM on 
the last trading day for 
the delivery month 
contract 
 08:45AM - 1:45 PM 
Taiwan time Monday 
through Friday of the 
regular Taiwan Stock 
Exchange business days 
 08:45AM-1:30PM on 
the last trading day for 
the expired contract 
Method of 
trading 
 Prior to Market Open 
(Orders accepted from 
8:30 to 8:45): Call 
auction at 8:45 
 During Trading Hours 
(From 8:45 to 13:45): 
Continuous Matching 
 Prior to Market Open 
(Orders accepted from 
8:30 to 8:45): Call 
auction at 8:45 
 During Trading Hours 
(From 8:45 to 13:45): 
Continuous Matching 
 Prior to Market Open 
(Orders accepted from 
8:30 to 8:45): Call 
auction at 8:45 
 During Trading Hours 
(From 8:45 to 13:45): 
Continuous Matching 
Tick size One index point (NT$ 
200) 
One index point (NT$ 50)  < 10 points: 0.1 point 
(NT$5) 
 >=10 points,<50 points: 
0.5 point (NT$25) 
 >=50 points, <500 
points: 1 point (NT$50) 
 >=500 points, <1,000 
points: 5 point 
(NT$250) 
 >=1,000 points: 10 point 
(NT$500) 
Average daily 
volume 
98,570 63,922 433,832 
    
Price limit 7% of the previous 
settlement price 
7% of the previous 
settlement price 
7% of the previous closing 
price of the underlying 
index 
 
  
                                                             
4 The data source is the TAIFEX website, and more details can be found in the following URL: 
http://www.taifex.com.tw/eng/eng2/TX.asp  
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Figure A1. The Variation in Initial Margin during January 2003 to September 2008. 
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Internet Appendix B: Descriptive Statistics by Year and Additional Analyses, 
and Robustness Checks   
 
Appendix B provides the descriptive statistics of the data by year, the results of additional 
tests, and the robustness checks in complement to the results in the main text. Specifically, the 
Appendix B contains: 
 
1. Descriptive Statistics of the Data in Taiwan Futures Exchange by Year: 
a. Number of market orders and contracts submitted and traded.  
b. Number of investors submitting limit orders in TAIFEX. 
c. Number of limit order contracts matched with the two investor types. 
d. Round-trip duration for the two index futures products. 
e. Cumulative distribution of investors on numbers of limit orders submitted. 
 
2. Additional Analyses: 
a. Definition of round number prices for options limit orders. 
b. Limit orders submission at round numbers and investment performance in 
the options markets. 
c. Submission ratio at “X0” and long-term investment performance. 
d. Submission ratio at “X0” and long-term investment performance for limit 
orders submitted at “X0” and non-“X0” prices. 
e. Limit order clustering at the last digit prices. 
f. Limit order clustering for investors without options trading. 
g. Limit order clustering for the two index futures products. 
h. Limit order clustering over time. 
i. Limit orders execution ratio and time-to-execution at “XY” price points. 
j. Limit orders buy-sell ratio at “XY” price points. 
 
3. Robustness Checks: 
Different sample filters and various definitions of round-numbered index futures 
prices. 
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Table B1. Market Orders and Trades in Taiwan Futures Exchange 
 Panel A: Number of Market Orders Submitted 
Year  Total Investor type Product type 
     Individual Institutional MXF TXF 
2003  2,015,574  1,962,682  52,892  545,908  1,469,666  
2004  2,458,067  2,363,627  94,440  738,767  1,719,300  
2005  1,447,864  1,400,140  47,724  374,960  1,072,904  
2006  2,292,074  2,190,809  101,265  638,951  1,653,123  
2007  3,172,267  3,086,196  86,071  1,105,158  2,067,109  
2008  4,608,112  4,504,201  103,911  2,096,429  2,511,683  
 
 
     Total  15,993,958  15,507,655  486,303  5,500,173  10,493,785  
Ratio  100.00% 96.96% 3.04% 34.39% 65.61% 
 Panel B: Number of Market Order Contracts Submitted 
Year Total Investor type Product type 
    Individual Institutional MXF TXF 
2003 3,800,784  3,597,579  203,205  747,890  3,052,894  
2004 4,744,810  4,349,674  395,136  1,013,877  3,730,933  
2005 2,790,302  2,622,773  167,529  521,832  2,268,470  
2006 4,505,184  4,201,853  303,331  935,302  3,569,882  
2007 5,893,247  5,593,744  299,503  1,543,108  4,350,139  
2008 7,798,193  7,503,351  294,842  2,787,625  5,010,568  
      Total 29,532,520  27,868,974  1,663,546  7,549,634  21,982,886  
Ratio 100.00% 94.37% 5.63% 25.56% 74.44% 
 Panel C: Number of Market Order Contracts Executed 
Year Total Investor type Product type 
    Individual Institutional MXF TXF 
2003 3,785,510  3,584,397  201,113  745,025  3,040,485  
2004 4,698,900  4,310,249  388,651  1,008,056  3,690,844  
2005 2,767,582  2,601,056  166,526  519,669  2,247,913  
2006 4,480,856  4,180,985  299,871  931,392  3,549,464  
2007 5,829,434  5,534,144  295,290  1,525,718  4,303,716  
2008 7,588,976  7,303,578  285,398  2,711,596  4,877,380  
      Total 29,151,258  27,514,409  1,636,849  7,441,456  21,709,802  
Ratio 100.00% 94.38% 5.62% 25.53% 74.47%  
This table reports the summary statistics of the number of market orders and contracts submitted and executed for 
two major Taiwan index futures in the Taiwan Futures Exchange from January 2003 to September 2008. In 2008, we 
only have orders data from January to September. The numbers of market orders and market-order contracts 
submitted are reported in Panels A and B, while numbers of market order contracts executed are reported in Panels C. 
The numbers of market orders (contracts) are reported separately for individual investors and institutional investors, 
and for Taiwan Stock Exchange Futures (TXF) and Mini-Taiwan Stock Exchange Futures (MXF). 
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Table B2. Number of Investors in Taiwan Futures Exchange 
 
 
Year Total Number of Investors Submitting Limit Orders 
  All Investors Individual Investors Institutional Investors 
2003 104,153  103,075  1,078  
2004 119,124  117,066  2,058  
2005 86,923  85,273  1,650  
2006 77,273  75,328  1,945  
2007 79,317  77,759  1,558  
2008 89,221  87,344  1,877  
    Total 556,011  545,845  10,166  
Ratio 100.00% 98.17% 1.83% 
 
This table reports the summary statistics of the number of investors submitting two major Taiwan index futures in 
Taiwan Futures Exchange from January 2003 to September 2008. In 2008, we only have trades data from January 
to September. The numbers of individual investors and institutional investors are reported separately. 
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Table B3. Average Round-trip Duration in Taiwan Futures Exchange 
 
  Round-trip duration (day) 
Year Individual investors Institutional investors 
  MXF TXF MXF TXF 
2003 1.821  1.551  1.557  1.925  
2004 1.424  1.226  1.103  1.543  
2005 2.336  1.949  2.068  2.629  
2006 1.285  1.004  1.001  1.771  
2007 0.884  0.755  0.555  1.532  
2008 0.631  0.532  0.439  1.247  
 
This table reports the average round-trip duration in Taiwan Futures Exchange from January 2003 to September 
2008. In 2008, we only include trades from January to September. Round-trip duration is the number of trading 
days between the initiating and closing position of a round-trip. The round-trip duration is reported separately for 
individual investors and institutional investors, and for Taiwan Stock Exchange Futures (TXF) and Mini-Taiwan 
Stock Exchange Futures (MXF). 
  
12 
 
Table B4. Contract Execution Matched by Different Investor Types 
 Panel A: Number of All Contracts  
  Hit by individual Hit by institutional Total Percentage 
Institutional investors 25,459,532  10,515,730  35,975,262  26% 
Individual investors 77,116,804  25,459,532  102,576,336  74% 
 
  
  
Total 102,576,336  35,975,262  138,551,598   
Percentage 74% 26%   100% 
 Panel B: Number of Initiating Contracts  
  Hit by individual Hit by institutional Total Percentage 
Institutional investors 13,971,795  5,605,958  19,577,753  27% 
Individual investors 40,860,447  13,373,484  54,233,931  73% 
 
  
  
Total 54,832,242  18,979,442  73,811,684   
Percentage 74% 26%   100% 
 
In this table we report the number of contracts executed when the transactions are matched with individual or 
institutional investors. For illustration, we report the number of all executed contracts and also separately for 
initiating contracts only. Initiating contracts are those to initiate new positions.
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Table B5: Definition of Round Number Prices for Options Limit Orders 
 
 
 
Options price (TWD) Tick size (TWD) Examples of round number prices  for the options limit orders (TWD) 
0~10 0.1 1, 2, 3, 4, … 
10~50 0.5 5, 10, 15, 20, … 
50~500 1 10, 20, 30, 40, … 
500~1000 5 50, 100, 150, 200, … 
>1000 10 100, 200, 300, 400, … 
 
This table presents the definitions of round-numbered prices for the index options limit orders. Options limit orders 
are considered as submitted at round numbers if the order prices are multiples of tenfold of the tick size. 
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Table B6. Limit Orders Clustering at Round Numbers and Investment Performance for Index Options 
 Panel A: Individual Investors 
Independent 
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟,𝑖,𝑡,𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑜 Mark-to-market return of options limit orders Mark-to-market return of options market orders Performance of Round-trip trades 
Variables   Intraday (%) 1-day (%) 5-day (%) Intraday (%) 1-day (%) 5-day (%) Daily profit (TWD) Daily index return (%) 
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑋0,𝑖,𝑡,𝑓𝑟𝑡𝑟𝑟𝑓𝑜 0.354*** -0.822*** -2.153*** -4.202*** -0.900 -1.591 -1.985 -4,707.234*** -236.311*** 
 
(0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.605) (0.564) (0.581) (0.000) (0.000) 
𝐿𝐿�𝑁𝑖,𝑡−1,𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑜� -0.006*** 0.159*** 0.321*** 0.556*** -0.189 -0.387 -0.125 812.861*** 123.432*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.335) (0.101) (0.716) (0.000) (0.000) 
𝐷𝑆𝐷𝐷𝑆𝐷𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐿𝑖,𝑡,𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑜 -0.004*** -0.289*** -0.281 -3.484*** -1.251** -0.658 -2.398** 5,274.790*** 35.018* 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.108) (0.000) (0.019) (0.285) (0.019) (0.000) (0.092) 
Intercept 0.183*** -1.072*** -3.265*** -8.309*** 0.124 2.994* 2.009 -1,652.278*** -349.572*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.927) (0.097) (0.429) (0.000) (0.000) 
Year-fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of obs. 50,310 43,702 43,689 43,557 19,555 19,213 17,848 49,845 49,845 
Adjusted R2 0.217 0.002 0.002 0.010 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.052 0.010 
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 Panel B: Institutional Investors 
Independent 
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟,𝑖,𝑡,𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑜 Mark-to-market return of options limit orders Mark-to-market return of options market orders Performance of Round-trip trades 
Variables   Intraday (%) 1-day (%) 5-day (%) Intraday (%) 1-day (%) 5-day (%) Daily profit (TWD) Daily index return (%) 
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑋0,𝑖,𝑡,𝑓𝑟𝑡𝑟𝑟𝑓𝑜 0.276*** -3.504 -1.553 -0.264 -7.050 -22.798 24.437 -6,637.397 868.189 
 
(0.000) (0.134) (0.651) (0.966) (0.382) (0.113) (0.368) (0.722) (0.146) 
𝐿𝐿�𝑁𝑖,𝑡−1,𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑜� -0.005** 0.206* 0.346 0.182 -0.213 1.473* 1.945 5,832.481*** 478.961*** 
 
(0.010) (0.078) (0.181) (0.704) (0.597) (0.073) (0.343) (0.003) (0.000) 
𝐷𝑆𝐷𝐷𝑆𝐷𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐿𝑖,𝑡,𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑜 0.008 -0.412 1.183 -1.596 -1.384 -1.630 3.392 19,868.213*** 442.490*** 
 
(0.232) (0.394) (0.291) (0.441) (0.445) (0.756) (0.584) (0.000) (0.002) 
Intercept 0.198*** -1.773 -3.662* -10.204** 2.374 -0.238 -35.747* -34,345.988*** -2,480.962*** 
 
(0.000) (0.188) (0.072) (0.023) (0.554) (0.985) (0.052) (0.008) (0.000) 
Year-fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of obs. 971 846 846 846 374 369 348 966 966 
Adjusted R2 0.145 0.009 0.001 0.004 -0.011 -0.001 -0.002 0.032 0.081 
 
In this table we report the parameter estimates for the following panel regression: 
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟,𝑖,𝑡,𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑜 𝑆𝑜 𝑆𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑜𝐿𝑖,𝑡,𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑜 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑋0,𝑖,𝑡,𝑓𝑟𝑡𝑟𝑟𝑓𝑜 + 𝛽2𝐿𝐿�𝑁𝑖,𝑡−1,𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑜� + 𝛽3 𝐷𝑆𝐷𝐷𝑆𝐷𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐿𝑖,𝑡,𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑜 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡    
where 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑋0,𝑖,𝑡,𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑜 is the investor i’s options limit order submission ratio at round numbers in year t-1. Since options tick size in TAIFEX depends on the transaction prices, we define 
“options round number prices” as the options prices that are multiples of tenfold of the tick size as shown in Table B5. 𝑆𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑜𝐿𝑖,𝑡,𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑜 is investor i’s mark-to-market returns or round-trip 
performance in the options market at year t.  𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑋0,𝑆,𝑆,𝑓𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑜𝑅𝐷 is investor i’s futures limit order submission ratio at “X0” price point in year t-1 (X is an integer ranging from 0 to 9). 
𝐿𝐿�𝑁𝑖,𝑡−1,𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑜� is the natural log of number of options limit orders submitted in year t-1. 𝐷𝑆𝐷𝐷𝑆𝐷𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐿𝑖,𝑡,𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑜 is the disposition effect in the options market, which is calculated as the difference 
between duration of losing and winning round-trips, divided by the average of the two. Results for individual investors and institutional investors are reported separately. To ensure reasonable 
submission ratio at “X0”, we require that investors must submit at least 10 futures limit orders in two consecutive years. Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity. *, **, and *** 
indicate significance levels of 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively. 
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Table B7. Submission Ratio at “X0” and Investor Longer-term Performance 
 Panel A: Individual Investors 
Independent Marked-to-market return of limit orders (%)   Marked-to-market return of market orders (%)   Average 
Variables 22-day return Month-end return Return till expiration   22-day return Month-end return Return till expiration   monthly profit (TWD) 
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑋0,𝑖,𝑡−1 -0.537*** -0.230*** -0.298*** 
 
-0.335*** -0.193*** -0.289*** 
 
-1,522.869*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.007) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
𝐿𝐿�𝑁𝑖,𝑡−1� 0.068*** 0.031*** 0.066*** 
 
0.018 0.021*** 0.049*** 
 
152.876*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.378) (0.001) (0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
𝐷𝑆𝐷𝐷𝑆𝐷𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐿𝑖,𝑡 -0.603*** -0.191*** -0.351*** 
 
-0.462*** -0.136*** -0.268*** 
 
-1,143.579*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
Intercept -0.342*** -0.314*** -0.303*** 
 
-0.229** -0.186*** -0.165*** 
 
-2,465.125*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.034) (0.000) (0.001) 
 
(0.000) 
Year Fixed-effect Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes 
Number of obs. 108,623 145,787 145,787 
 
41,213 83,850 83,850  146,254 
Adjusted R2 0.029 0.050 0.048   0.013 0.012 0.012   0.048 
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 Panel B: Institutional Investors 
Independent Marked-to-market return of limit orders (%)   Marked-to-market return of market orders (%)   Average 
Variables 22-day return Month-end return Return till expiration   22-day return Month-end return Return till expiration   monthly profit (TWD) 
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑋0,𝑖,𝑡−1 -1.006 -0.708*** -1.159*** 
 
-1.482 0.222 -0.294 
 
-2,334.086** 
 
(0.193) (0.001) (0.000) 
 
(0.300) (0.590) (0.646) 
 
(0.035) 
𝐿𝐿�𝑁𝑖,𝑡−1� 0.122** 0.006 0.074** 
 
0.063 0.016 0.004 
 
-122.521 
 (0.043) (0.727) (0.019) 
 
(0.577) (0.659) (0.935) 
 
(0.212) 
𝐷𝑆𝐷𝐷𝑆𝐷𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐿𝑖,𝑡 -0.210 -0.240*** -0.491*** 
 
-0.774** 0.017 -0.136 
 
-1,211.594*** 
 
(0.185) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.012) (0.850) (0.327) 
 
(0.000) 
Intercept -0.286 0.206 -0.009 
 
0.252 0.082 0.403 
 
315.205 
 
(0.513) (0.162) (0.968) 
 
(0.754) (0.790) (0.336) 
 
(0.677) 
Year Fixed-effect Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes 
Number of obs. 1,463 1,982 1,982 
 
520 1,106 1,106  1,991 
Adjusted R2 0.027 0.030 0.044   0.027 0.000 0.012   0.020 
 
In this table we report the parameter estimates for the following panel regression: 𝑆𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑜𝐿𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑋0,𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2 𝐿𝐿�𝑁𝑖,𝑡−1� + 𝛽3 𝐷𝑆𝐷𝐷𝑆𝐷𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐿𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡  
where 𝑆𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑜𝐿𝑖,𝑡 is the longer-term average mark-to-market returns or average monthly profit per contract for investor i at year t. The longer-term Mark-to-market returns of limit orders are 
calculated in three different variations: a) from the submission to 22 trading days afterwards, b) from the submission to the end of the calendar month, and c) from the submission to the 
expiration day (the third Wednesday of the expiration month). The average monthly profit is the average profit of transactions conducted within a month. The profit of unclosed positions is 
calculated assuming that they are closed out by the end of the month. 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑋0,𝑖,𝑡−1 is investor i’s submission ratio at “X0” price points in the previous year (X is an integer ranging from 0 to 
9). 𝐿𝐿�𝑁𝑖,𝑡−1� is the log of number of limit orders submitted in the previous year. 𝐷𝑆𝐷𝐷𝑆𝐷𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐿𝑖,𝑡 is the difference between the current year’s duration of losing and winning round-trips, divided 
by the average of the two. Results for individual and institutional investors are reported separately. Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity. To ensure reasonable submission ratio at 
“X0”, we require that investors must submit at least 10 limit orders in each of the two consecutive years. *, **, and *** indicate significance levels of 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively. 
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Table B8. Submission Ratio at “X0” and Longer-term Mark-to-market Return of Limit Orders Submitted at “X0” and Non-“X0” Prices 
 Panel A: Individual Investors 
Independent Marked-to-market return of limit orders submitted at "X0" (%)   Marked-to-market return of limit orders submitted at non-"X0" (%) 
Variables 22-day return Month-end return Return till expiration   22-day return Month-end return Return till expiration 
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑋0,𝑖,𝑡−1 -0.537*** -0.230*** -0.298*** 
 
-0.335*** -0.193*** -0.289*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.007) (0.000) (0.000) 
𝐿𝐿�𝑁𝑖,𝑡−1� 0.068*** 0.031*** 0.066*** 
 
0.018 0.021*** 0.049*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.378) (0.001) (0.000) 
𝐷𝑆𝐷𝐷𝑆𝐷𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐿𝑖,𝑡 -0.603*** -0.191*** -0.351*** 
 
-0.462*** -0.136*** -0.268*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Intercept -0.342*** -0.314*** -0.303*** 
 
-0.229** -0.186*** -0.165*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.034) (0.000) (0.001) 
Year Fixed-effect Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes 
Number of obs. 108,623 145,787 145,787 
 
41,213 83,850 83,850 
Adjusted R2 0.029 0.050 0.048   0.013 0.012 0.012 
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 Panel B: Institutional Investors 
Independent Marked-to-market return of limit orders submitted at "X0" (%)   Marked-to-market return of limit orders submitted at non-"X0" (%) 
Variables 22-day return Month-end return Return till expiration   22-day return Month-end return Return till expiration 
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑋0,𝑖,𝑡−1 -1.006 -0.708*** -1.159*** 
 
-1.482 0.222 -0.294 
 
(0.193) (0.001) (0.000) 
 
(0.300) (0.590) (0.646) 
𝐿𝐿�𝑁𝑖,𝑡−1� 0.122** 0.006 0.074** 
 
0.063 0.016 0.004 
 (0.043) (0.727) (0.019) 
 
(0.577) (0.659) (0.935) 
𝐷𝑆𝐷𝐷𝑆𝐷𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐿𝑖,𝑡 -0.210 -0.240*** -0.491*** 
 
-0.774** 0.017 -0.136 
 
(0.185) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.012) (0.850) (0.327) 
Intercept -0.286 0.206 -0.009 
 
0.252 0.082 0.403 
 
(0.513) (0.162) (0.968) 
 
(0.754) (0.790) (0.336) 
Year Fixed-effect Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes 
Number of obs. 1,463 1,982 1,982 
 
520 1,106 1,106 
Adjusted R2 0.027 0.030 0.044   0.027 0.000 0.012 
 
In this table we report the parameter estimates for the following panel regression: 𝑆𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑜𝐿𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑋0,𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2 𝐿𝐿�𝑁𝑖,𝑡−1� + 𝛽3 𝐷𝑆𝐷𝐷𝑆𝐷𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐿𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡  
where 𝑆𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑜𝐿𝑖,𝑡 is the average longer-term mark-to-market returns of limit orders submitted at “X0” or non-“X0” prices for investor i at year t. The longer-term Mark-to-market returns of limit 
orders are calculated in three different variations: a) from the submission to 22 trading days afterwards, b) from the submission to the end of the calendar month, and c) from the submission to 
the expiration day (the third Wednesday of the expiration month). 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑋0,𝑖,𝑡−1 is investor i’s submission ratio at “X0” price points in the previous year (X is an integer ranging from 0 to 9). 
𝐿𝐿�𝑁𝑖,𝑡−1� is the log of number of limit orders submitted in the previous year. 𝐷𝑆𝐷𝐷𝑆𝐷𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐿𝑖,𝑡  is the difference between the current year’s duration of losing and winning round-trips, divided by 
the average of the two. Results for individual and institutional investors are reported separately. Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity. To ensure reasonable submission ratio at “X0”, 
we require that investors must submit at least 10 limit orders in each of the two consecutive years. *, **, and *** indicate significance levels of 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively.
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Table B9. Robustness Test for Submission Ratio at Round Numbers and Investment 
Performance 
 Panel A: Individual Investors 
Investment Diff (Q5-Q1) 
Performance More than 5 limit orders in two years   More than 15 limit orders in two years 
  𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆00 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆0050 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑋0   𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆00 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆0050 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑋0 
Mark-to-market returns of all initiating limit orders 
Intraday return (%) -0.009*** -0.025*** -0.038*** 
 
-0.015*** -0.032*** -0.039*** 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
1-day return (%) -0.036*** -0.061*** -0.079*** 
 
-0.036*** -0.058*** -0.067*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
5-day return (%) -0.101*** -0.128*** -0.166*** 
 
-0.071*** -0.099*** -0.133*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Mark-to-market returns of initiating limit orders submitted at "X0" prices 
Intraday return (%) -0.059*** -0.034*** -0.062*** 
 
-0.017* -0.036*** -0.059*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.056) (0.000) (0.000) 
1-day return (%) -0.094*** -0.053*** -0.110*** 
 
-0.037** -0.051*** -0.094*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.039) (0.000) (0.000) 
5-day return (%) -0.188*** -0.149*** -0.232*** 
 
-0.076** -0.144*** -0.188*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.028) (0.000) (0.000) 
Mark-to-market returns of initiating limit orders submitted at non-"X0" prices 
Intraday return (%) -0.008*** -0.025*** -0.025*** 
 
-0.015*** -0.031*** -0.029*** 
 (0.005) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
1-day return (%) -0.034*** -0.064*** -0.065*** 
 
-0.036*** -0.063*** -0.061*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
5-day return (%) -0.077*** -0.121*** -0.119*** 
 
-0.065*** -0.096*** -0.106*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Mark-to-market return of all imitating market orders 
Intraday return (%) -0.010** -0.029*** -0.044*** 
 
-0.019*** -0.039*** -0.049*** 
 (0.037) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
1-day return (%) -0.032*** -0.053*** -0.084*** 
 
-0.051*** -0.066*** -0.082*** 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
5-day return (%) -0.047** -0.073*** -0.125*** 
 
-0.079*** -0.075*** -0.121*** 
 (0.019) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.000) 
Performance of round-trip trades 
Daily profit (TWD) -221.26*** -346.03*** -872.46*** 
 
-475.42*** -667.92*** -1136.8*** 
 (0.008) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Daily index return (%) -0.038*** -0.043*** -0.099*** 
 
-0.059*** -0.076*** -0.119*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
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 Panel B: Institutional Investors 
Investment Diff (Q5-Q1) 
Performance More than 5 limit orders in two years   More than 15 limit orders in two years 
  𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆00 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆0050 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑋0   𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆00 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆0050 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑋0 
Mark-to-market returns of all initiating limit orders 
Intraday return (%)  -0.011 -0.056** -0.081*** 
 
 -0.027 -0.034* -0.060*** 
 (0.626) (0.024) (0.001) 
 
(0.172) (0.082) (0.002) 
1-day return (%)   0.008  -0.042  -0.065 
 
 -0.021 -0.093** -0.067* 
 (0.884) (0.438) (0.173) 
 
(0.613) (0.028) (0.098) 
5-day return (%)   0.047  -0.012 -0.218** 
 
 -0.030 -0.187** -0.155* 
 (0.641) (0.912) (0.028) 
 
(0.751) (0.046) (0.093) 
Mark-to-market returns of initiating limit orders submitted at "X0" prices 
Intraday return (%)   0.018  -0.099 -0.090*** 
 
 -0.058  -0.017  -0.050 
 (0.812) (0.105) (0.005) 
 
(0.419) (0.769) (0.106) 
1-day return (%)   0.197   0.153   0.010 
 
  0.105   0.115   0.014 
 (0.147) (0.190) (0.889) 
 
(0.453) (0.283) (0.820) 
5-day return (%)   0.104   0.055  -0.200 
 
  0.007  -0.096  -0.088 
 (0.670) (0.800) (0.140) 
 
(0.977) (0.648) (0.487) 
Mark-to-market returns of initiating limit orders submitted at non-"X0" prices 
Intraday return (%)   0.004 -0.042* -0.058** 
 
 -0.020  -0.025 -0.067*** 
 (0.863) (0.089) (0.040) 
 
(0.303) (0.212) (0.010) 
1-day return (%)   0.015  -0.060  -0.069 
 
 -0.018 -0.094** -0.089* 
 (0.763) (0.265) (0.188) 
 
(0.676) (0.026) (0.063) 
5-day return (%)   0.040  -0.022 -0.270** 
 
 -0.042 -0.192** -0.213** 
 (0.692) (0.835) (0.015) 
 
(0.663) (0.045) (0.037) 
Mark-to-market return of all initiating market orders 
Intraday return (%)  -0.032  -0.003   0.000 
 
 -0.028  -0.020   0.013 
 (0.450) (0.944) (0.999) 
 
(0.537) (0.673) (0.792) 
1-day return (%)  -0.037  -0.072   0.020 
 
 -0.026  -0.055   0.114 
 (0.686) (0.474) (0.841) 
 
(0.818) (0.652) (0.346) 
5-day return (%)   0.065  -0.021   0.035 
 
  0.195   0.023   0.142 
 (0.763) (0.921) (0.868) 
 
(0.425) (0.931) (0.561) 
Performance of round-trip trades 
Daily profit (TWD)  -14,508 -64,686*** -49,772** 
 
 -39,304 -84,118*** -56,748* 
 (0.264) (0.001) (0.029) 
 
(0.117) (0.001) (0.059) 
Daily index return (%)  -1.032 -5.056*** -3.916** 
 
 -2.760 -6.514*** -4.421** 
  (0.268) (0.000) (0.020)   (0.120) (0.000) (0.043) 
 
In this table we sort investors into quintiles by their limit order submission ratio at round numbers in the previous 
year, and report the difference in the current year’s performance of quintile-5 (Q5) investors and quintile-1 (Q1) 
investors where the Q5 investors have highest submission ratio. We employ three specifications to identify round 
number prices: prices ending with “00”, prices ending with “00” and “50”, and prices ending with “X0” (X is an 
integer ranging from 0 to 9). For investment performance, we look at the mark-to-market intraday, 1-day and 5-day 
returns of all initiating limit orders, initiating limit orders submitted at “X0” prices, initiating limit orders 
submitted at non-“X0” prices, all initiating market orders, as well as the performance of round-trip trades. 
Mark-to-market intraday return is the difference between execution price and the same day’s closing price, divided 
by the execution price. 1-day and 5-day index returns are defined similarly. All items are first calculated for each 
investor-year pair and then averaged up in each quintile. Results for individual and institutional investors are 
reported separately. The Satterthwaite p-value assumes unequal variances of investor performance in quintiles 1 
and 5. To ensure reasonable submission ratio at round numbers, we require that investors must submit at least 5 or 
15 limit orders in two consecutive years. *, **, and *** indicate significance levels of 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01, 
respectively. 
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Figure B1. Cumulative Density Functions of Investors in Taiwan Futures Exchange 
 
 
 
The two figures report the cumulative distribution of the investors submitting limit orders in Taiwan Futures 
Exchange from January 2003 to September 2008. In 2008, we only include investors from January to September. 
The cumulative distribution of investors is calculated as the number of investors with fewer or equal to N limit 
orders submitted divided by total number of investors, while N ranges from 1 to 100. Individual investors and 
institutional investors are reported in the top and bottom figures, respectively.  
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Figure B2. Limit Order Clustering at the Last One Digit  
 
 
 
 
In this figure, we plot the frequency of limit orders submitted at “X” price points. The frequency at “X” price point 
is defined as the number of limit orders submitted at “X” divided by total number of limit orders submitted at all 
different “X”s (X is an integer ranging from 0 to 9). 
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Figure B3. Limit Order Clustering for Investors without Options Trading  
 
 
 
In this figure, we plot the frequency of limit orders submitted at “XY” price points for a subset of investors without 
options trading. The frequency at “XY” is defined as the number of limit orders submitted at “XY” divided by total 
number of limit orders submitted at all different “XY”s (X and Y are integers ranging from 0 to 9). 
 
 
25 
 
Figure B4. Limit Order Clustering for Different Products  
 
In this figure, we plot the frequency of limit orders submitted at “XY” price points separately for Taiwan Stock 
Exchange Index Futures (TXF) and Mini-Taiwan Stock Exchange Index Futures (MXF). The frequency at “XY” is 
defined as the number of TXF (MXF) limit orders submitted at “XY” divided by total number of TXF (MXF) limit 
orders submitted at all “XY”s (X and Y are integers ranging from 0 to 9). 
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Figure B5. Limit Order Clustering Over Time 
 
 
 
 
In this figure, we plot the frequency of limit orders submitted at multiples of a hundred from 2003 to 2008. In 2008, 
we have access to data from January to September only. The frequencies are calculated for individual investors and 
institutional investors separately. 
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Figure B6. Execution Ratio at “XY” price point  
 
 
 
In this figure, we plot the execution ratio for the non-cancelled limit orders against the last two digits of the order 
price, separately for small and large limit orders. We classify small orders as those with only one contract, and 
large orders as those with more than five contracts. Execution ratio at “XY” price points is defined as the number 
of limit orders executed when they are submitted at “XY”s divided by the total number of non-cancelled limit 
orders submitted at “XY” price points (X and Y are integers ranging from 0 to 9). 
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Figure B7. Time-to-execution at “XY” price point  
 
 
 
In this figure, we plot the time-to-execution for the executed limit orders against the last two digits of the limit 
order price, separately for small and large limit orders. Time-to-execution at “XY” price points is defined as the 
interval between the limit order’s submission time and the execution time when they are submitted at “XY” price 
points (X and Y are integers ranging from 0 to 9). We classify small orders as those with only one contract, and 
large orders as those with more than five contracts. 
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Figure B8. Buy-Sell Ratio at “XY” price point  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In this figure, we plot the buy-sell ratio against the last two digits of the limit order prices. Buy-sell ratio at “XY” 
price points is defined as the number of limit buy orders submitted at “XY”s divided by total number limit sell 
orders submitted at “XY”s (X and Y are integers ranging from 0 to 9). 
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